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Challenges and Opportunities for the Indonesian 
Securities Takeover Regulations: A Comparative 
Legal Analysis 
 
Yozua Makes* 
 
This article examines the extent to which the rules in Indonesia 
concerning the takeover of a publicly listed company: (1) facilitate an 
efficient exchange of shares in the capital market with fair protection 
for all stakeholders in a takeover transaction pursuant to Good 
Corporate Governance (“GCG”) principles; and (2) uphold principles 
and protection provided by the securities laws of more developed 
jurisdictions. These issues are addressed by analyzing the prevailing 
securities regulations and GCG rules in Indonesia. A comparative 
discussion of laws and regulations in Indonesia and the Netherlands 
follows. The article highlights several important findings from which the 
Indonesian legal system can learn from both European and Dutch 
takeover laws. First, Indonesia has been experiencing a trend toward a 
lower mandatory bid threshold requirement in order to facilitate a more 
active takeover market. The share percentage threshold for triggering a 
mandatory offer in Indonesia is lower than that of the Netherlands, 
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although in Indonesia, control can be assessed by the degree of one’s 
influence within the company’s governance. In pricing the mandatory 
bid, the two countries adopt a different approach, but the Netherlands 
arguably adopts a more case-specific approach through the active 
involvement of its judiciary. Regarding disclosure of the control 
structure, the shareholding structure of the target company in the 
Netherlands is more advanced because it captures indirect structures, 
such as pyramid structures or cross ownership. Indonesia can also 
learn from its European counterpart in relation to the employee 
involvement in proceeding with a takeover deal. In the Netherlands, as 
in Indonesia, the employee does not have the authority to approve or 
disapprove a takeover; however, employees have the right to receive 
information, consultation rights, and a dispute settlement forum 
specifically for labor matters in the event of a change of corporate 
control. Indonesian law, on the other hand, prescribes that a takeover 
must take into account the employees’ interests without setting out 
further detailed rules. Finally, the role of the judiciary in Indonesia 
must be improved in order to provide a fair, orderly, and efficient 
capital market. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been increasing attention given to the importance of 
takeovers in supporting Indonesia’s economic growth. Indonesia’s capital 
market has experienced a significant increase in takeovers through asset and 
share acquisitions, which have contributed to and are stimulating the growth of 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (“IDX”) composite share price index.1 Merger 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 There is no comprehensive data on takeover deals available in Indonesia. Hence, 
information regarding takeovers is limited to companies listed on the IDX, or those 
deals that are announced publicly as required under the capital market regulations. In 
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activity in the United States, for example, shows that the number and price of 
takeovers affect the dynamics of its capital market.2 A takeover reflects the 
business fundamentals and perception of the issuer, and may consequently 
affect the Indonesian stock market in general. An inefficient “market for 
corporate control”3 would discourage optimal corporate growth and, in the 
long run, result in a more stagnant capital market.4 At the same time, the 
benefit of the expected growth must be fairly allocated between both the 
controlling and the minority shareholders. Therefore, to support the healthy 
growth of the market, securities regulations must facilitate transactions in the 
capital market by balancing fairness and efficiency. 
 
This article examines the extent to which the rules in Indonesia 
concerning takeover of a publicly listed company (1) facilitate efficient 
exchange of shares in the capital market with fair protection for all 
stakeholders in a takeover transaction pursuant to GCG principles; and (2) 
accommodate the principles and protection provided in the securities laws of 
more developed jurisdictions. This article will address the first part of the 
question by analyzing the current Indonesian legal framework from the 
perspective of fairness and efficiency in securities law and corporate 
governance principles. A comparative discussion of laws and regulations in 
Indonesia and the Netherlands, including the incorporation of the EU Takeover 
Directive, will address the second part of the question. 
 
From a comparative company law perspective,5  there are several 
reasons why this article uses Netherlands as a benchmark country. First, 
Indonesian company law is founded on Dutch company law following the 
colonial era.6 However, since then many driving forces have influenced both 
countries’ securities laws and GCG principles. Both Indonesia and the 
Netherlands are concerned about corporate scandals in the United States, and 
many countries have reconsidered how they should handle corporate 
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recent years, takeovers of companies listed on the IDX have been driven mainly by the 
mining and retail sectors. Other industries also active in takeover deals are 
telecommunications and banking. The author would like to thank M. Ajisatria 
Suleiman for his assistance in completing this research. 
2 See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 2-5 
(2000) (describing the merger and acquisition movement and its relationship with the 
U.S. economy). 
3 CARNEY, supra note 3, at 36. 
4 See id. at 36 (describing the general economic structure of acquisition). 
5 See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, 1162-91 (ECGI Working Paper 
Series in Law, Working Paper No. 77, 2006) (laying out the general framework of 
comparative company law). 
6 Id. at 1178. Before Indonesia enacted the first company law in 1995, the company 
law in the country was based upon the provisions of the Indonesian Commercial Code, 
also known as Wetboek van Koophandel, promulgated in 1847 during the Dutch 
colonial era. See BENNY S. TABALUJAN, INDONESIAN COMPANY LAW: A TRANSLATION 
AND COMMENTARY 18 (1997). 
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governance practices.7 In Indonesia, a determining factor was its economic 
downturn during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, which many experts 
argued was primarily due to the failure of corporate governance (policies).8 
Meanwhile, the corporate governance system in the Netherlands underwent 
important changes during the first half of the 1990s.9 
 
One such change in Dutch takeover regulations was the introduction 
of the European Union (EU) Takeover Directive, which aims to create a 
harmonized playing field for the European capital markets in order to support 
the region’s economic integration.10 The Directive adopts rules, which have 
been transposed into Dutch law, that share similarities with, or can serve as a 
benchmark for, the Indonesian securities takeover laws. Therefore, due to both 
their common ancestry and the recent divergence of their laws, it is useful to 
assess how these two countries have developed their takeover rules. 
 
To properly compare Indonesia and the Netherlands, this article will 
focus on the differences between the two countries’ corporate structures 
because such differences demonstrate the characteristics of each countries’ 
securities laws and corporate governance principles. 11  In Indonesia, the 
corporate structure is dominated by concentrated ownership in the hands of a 
limited number of business groups that control market capitalization.12 In 
Indonesia and similar countries, the protection of minority shareholders rather 
than majority or controlling shareholders is more vital than in countries with 
dispersed ownership. Compared to that of Indonesia, the ownership structure 
in the Netherlands is one of the most dispersed, although it is not as dispersed 
as those of the United States or the United Kingdom.13 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance 
Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, 21 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 243, 261-67 (2002). 
8 See infra, notes 22, 25-27; see also Carolyn Currie, Regulatory Failure in Emerging 
Market, (UTS Sch. Fin.  Econ. Working Paper No. 118, 2002) (discussing regulatory 
failure in financial crisis using the case of Indonesia). 
9 Jaron van Bekkum, Steven Hijink, Michael Schouten & Jaap Winter, Corporate 
Governance in the Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW 
3-5 (2009). 
10 See COMMON LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE 4-8 (Dirk Van 
Gerven, ed., 2008). 
11 See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Corporate Ownership around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 512 (1999) (“[I]t seems more 
likely that the existing ownership structures are primarily an equilibrium response to 
the domestic legal environments that companies operate in.”). 
12 Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study, 
Disclosure, Information and Enforcement, OECD (Mar. 2012), available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/38/50068886.pdf (citing OECD-Indonesia policy dialogue 
on disclosure of beneficial ownership and control, Bali on 5 Oct. 2011, in which the 
author quoted S. Claessen, S. Djankov and L.H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership 
and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (2000)); see also, Benny 
S. Tabalujan, Family Capitalism and Corporate Governance of Family-Controlled 
Listed Companies in Indonesia, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 486, 513 (2002). 
13 See Renneboog et al., supra note 8, at 261-67; see also John C. Coffee, The Future 
as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its 
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 This article argues that in Indonesia there is a tension in the regulatory 
objective of takeover rules, i.e. facilitating a more active market and protecting 
the relevant parties (especially the minority shareholders), the business 
sustainability of the target company, and other stakeholders such as 
employees. In a broader framework, the academic debate on comparative 
corporate governance has also raised this issue, because of the different nature 
of company law and corporate governance on the one hand (which embraces 
fair protection of not only shareholders but also stakeholders) and securities 
law on the other hand (which aims at facilitating efficient market exchange 
among shareholders).14 The objective of the Indonesian securities law regime 
is contemplated in Law Number 8 of 1995 on the Capital Market (“Law 
8/1995”), pursuant to which the objective of the law and regulatory institutions 
is to create an orderly, fair, and efficient (teratur, wajar, dan efisien) capital 
market in the interests of shareholders and society as a whole.15 
 
There is no formal agreed upon English translation of the Indonesian 
term “pengambilalihan” as used in Law No. 40 of 2007 (“Law 40/2007”) and 
Government Regulation No. 27 of 1998 (“GR 27/1998”). While the word 
commonly is translated as “acquisition”, in practice the term occasionally is 
translated as “takeover.”16 In this article the terms “acquisition” and “takeover” 
are used interchangeably to mean the procurement of a controlling interest in a 
company or its assets. In Indonesia, takeovers of public companies are a 
common practice. Generally, there first is an acquisition of company shares, 
which leads to an obligation to conduct a mandatory bid—namely, an offer to 
purchase the remaining shares held by the public shareholders (in Indonesia, 
the more common term is “mandatory tender offer”).17 It must be noted that a 
hostile (unfriendly) offer has yet to be practiced in Indonesia. 
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Significance, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641, 669-75 (1999); Allen Ferrell, Why Continental 
European Takeover Law Matters, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN 
EUROPE 561 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the need for takeover laws 
in continental Europe); HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT OF 
THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf; HIGH LEVEL 
GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE 
HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO TAKEOVER 
BIDS (2002), available at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/news/hlg01-
2002.pdf [hereinafter “The Winter Report”]. 
14 See P.A. VAN DER SCHEE, REGULATION OF ISSUERS AND INVESTOR PROTECTION IN 
THE US AND EU: A TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON OF THE BASICS OF SECURITIES AND 
CORPORATE LAW 26-36 (2011). 
15 Law 8/1995 art. 4 (Indon.). 
16 In legal practice, Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 on “Pengambilalihan Perusahaan 
Terbuka” is translated as “Takeover of Public Company.” Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 
(2011), available at  
http://www.bapepam.go.id/old/old/E_Legal/rules/Issuer/IXH1_NEW.PDF (providing 
an unofficial translation of the rule). 
17 In 2007, there were 16 takeover and mandatory tender offer (MTO) transactions that 
occurred in the stock exchange, but there were no Voluntary Tender Offers (VTO). In 
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The next section will provide an overview of the underlying legal and 
institutional framework in Indonesia, which is discussed in subsequent 
sections. The third section will discuss the laws and regulations for general 
acquisitions and takeovers of publicly listed companies in Indonesia. The 
fourth section discusses how Indonesia’s securities takeover regulations can be 
improved from the perspective of European and Dutch law. In conclusion, this 
article finds that mandatory bids in Indonesia have been trending toward a 
lower threshold to facilitate a more active takeover market. The share 
percentage threshold for triggering a mandatory offer in Indonesia is lower 
than that in the Netherlands; however, in Indonesia control can be measured by 
the degree of influence within the company’s governance structure. In pricing 
mandatory bids, each country has a different approach, although the 
Netherlands arguably adopts a more case-specific approach through the 
involvement of its judiciary. The shareholding structure of a target company in 
the Netherlands is more advanced because it captures indirect structures, such 
as pyramid structures or cross ownership. In addition, Indonesia can learn from 
its European counterpart about the involvement of employees in a takeover 
deal process. Although in the Netherlands, as in Indonesia, an employee does 
not have authority to approve or reject a takeover, employees do have the right 
to receive information, consultation rights, and a dispute settlement forum for 
labor matters in the event of a change in corporate control. In contrast, 
Indonesian law requires that a company take its employees’ interests into 
account, although it does not provide detailed rules. Finally, the role of the 
judiciary in Indonesia must be improved to build a fair, orderly, and efficient 
capital market. 
II. SECURITIES REGULATION IN INDONESIA – HISTORY AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
A. Historical Development 
The Indonesian capital market existed during the Dutch colonial 
period in 1912, and was reestablished in 1952 after Indonesia gained 
independence.18 However, it did not become active until the 1987 financial 
sector deregulation, after which certain Indonesian companies more actively 
pursued public listings.19 Law 8/1995 provides the basic legal system for a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2008, there were nine takeover MTO deals and no VTO. In 2009, there were nine 
takeovers and MTOs for eight (8) issuers/public companies, as well as one VTO. In 
2010, the market saw 10 (ten) takeovers and MTO transactions and no VTO. In 2011, 
there were 11 (eleven) takeover and MTO transactions, as well as 3 (three) VTO 
transactions. Data is available in Bapepam-LK Annual Report 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
and 2011, all available at  
http://www.bapepam.go.id/pasar_modal/publikasi_pm/annual_report_pm/index.htm. 
18 M. IRSAN NASARUDIN & INDRA SURYA, ASPEK HUKUM PASAR MODAL INDONESIA 
[LEGAL ASPECTS OF CAPITAL MARKETS IN INDONESIA] 66-73 (LKPMK & Fakultas 
Hukum UI, 2007) (Indon.). 
19  After the static development of the stock exchange, in 1987 the Indonesian 
government implemented the 1987 December Policy (Pakdes 87), which relaxed the 
requirements for initial public offerings (IPOs) and foreign participation in the stock 
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modern capital market to develop. Despite its modernized system, however, 
the Indonesian capital market has been relatively exposed to external shocks.20 
In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis (“AFC”) impacted the Indonesian economy 
and created a multidimensional political and social crisis.21 What started as a 
currency crisis in Thailand reached Indonesia as systemic economic risk.22 
This monetary crisis led to Indonesia’s adoption of a free floating exchange 
rate to cope with increased demand for US dollars and, therefore, decreasing 
foreign exchange reserves, which made the Rupiah fall further.23 In Indonesia, 
the banking industry was affected the most because of the revocation of 16 
banks’ licenses in November 1997, which created negative sentiment in the 
financial market.24 The stock exchange could not escape from this collapse 
either: the composite price index (indeks harga saham gabungan, IHSG) fell 
from 740.8 in July 1997 to 339.5 in mid-December 1997 and market 
capitalization was reduced to one-seventh of its value as compared to July 
1997.25 The Crisis triggered social and political unrest in Indonesia, which 
toppled the ruling “New Order” regime and ushered in a new era characterized 
by a free market economy and democracy.26 
 
After undergoing significant political, legal, and institutional reforms, 
the Indonesian capital market has proven to be resilient and has enjoyed 
significant growth, particularly since 2004. The 2008 global crisis temporarily 
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exchange. The following year also saw extensive financial sector deregulation for both 
the banking and capital market industries, which enabled more issuers and investors to 
participate in the market. See id. at 66-73. 
20 The most recent example is the 2008 global financial crisis which also affected the 
Indonesian capital market, including slowing down the country’s growth rate and 
delaying several companies’ plans to launch initial public offerings (IPOs) due to 
market uncertainty. 
21 Saud Husnan, Indonesia, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE IN EAST ASIA: 
A STUDY OF INDONESIA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, MALAYSIA, PHILIPPINES, AND 
THAILAND 1 (Juzhong Zhuang, David Edwards, & Virginia Capulong, eds., 2000). 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24  See Benny S. Tabalujan, Why Indonesian Corporate Governance Failed – 
Conjectures Concerning Legal Culture, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 141, 142 (2002) 
[hereinafter Tabalujan, Why Corporate Governance Failed]. 
25 See Mochammad Rosul, The Capital Market in Indonesia’s Economy: Development 
and Prospects, in CAPITAL MARKETS IN ASIA: CHANGING ROLES FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (Denis Hew & Donna Vandenbrink, eds., 2005); see generally Benny 
S. Tabalujan, Corporate Governance of Indonesian Banks – The Legal and Business 
Contexts, 3 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 67 (2001) (discussing the legal and business 
contexts of corporate governance in the Indonesian banking sector after the Asian 
Financial Crisis) [hereinafter, Tabalujan, Indonesian Banks]. 
26 There has been extensive literature concerning the impact of the 1997 crisis on the 
Indonesian political reform. See, e.g., Hal Hill & Takashi Shiraishi, Indonesia After 
the Asian Crisis, ASIAN ECON. POL’Y REV. 123 (2007) (reviewing the political impact 
of the 1997 crisis); Yuri Sato, Overview of the Seven Years’ Experiment: What 
Changed and What Matters?, 43 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 3 (2005) (discussing 
the changes brought on by the 1997 crisis). 
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affected the stock market, but it recovered quickly. 27  The Indonesian 
government recognizes that the capital market is a key pillar in supporting 
Indonesia’s economic growth, the country’s long-term vision and development 
plan for 2025, and its four-track (pro-poor, pro-growth, pro-job, and pro-
environment) strategy.28 
 
While the Indonesian capital market system was weak in 1997, 
Indonesia suffered more from the AFC than did other Asian countries because 
of its comparative failure in implementing corporate governance principles.29 
As a result, after the AFC the Indonesian securities regulatory regime adopted 
an approach that focused on promoting the principles of GCG. Certain studies 
believe that weak corporate governance turned the external shock from the 
monetary crisis into prolonged financial turmoil. For example, Benny 
Tabalujan did a survey on financial and economic literature that highlighted 
certain corporate governance problems in Asia, especially Indonesia, which 
contributed to the crisis.30 Simon Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman offer 
country-level evidence, which suggests that weak legal institutions concerning 
corporate governance, particularly investor protection mechanisms, were an 
essential missing factor that worsened the stock market decline during the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.31 In countries with few or weak investor protection 
mechanisms, net capital inflows were more sensitive to negative events that 
adversely affect investor confidence. In such countries, expropriation risks 
increased and expected returns on investment decreased during crises, which 
made collapses in currency and stock values more likely.32 Stijn Claessens, 
Simeon Djankov, and Larry Lang also found concentrated ownership and 
extensive family control were very severe, particularly in Indonesia along with 
the Philippines and Thailand, which condition led to owners’ excessive power 
to pursue their interests at the expense of minority shareholders, creditors, and 
other stakeholders.33    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 In October 2008, the composite share price index (Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan 
or IHSG) of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (Bursa Efek Indonesia) or IDX fell sharply, 
forcing IDX to suspend trading for several days. The suspension started on Oct. 8, 
2008 (when the IHSG dived 10.38% to the level of 1,451.669 points) and lasted until 
Oct. 13, 2008. See Tabalujan, Indonesian Banks, supra note 26, at 67. For statistics of 
market activity and share movement within the Indonesia Stock Exchange, please refer 
to http://www.idx.co.id/. 
28 This was mentioned in the speech of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on 
Jan. 3, 2011, when the stock market opened, and during subsequent dialogues with 
stakeholders of the capital market. See Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President, 
Republic of Indonesia, The Opening of the Trading Day at the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (Jan. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2011/01/03/1553.html); Dialogue with 
the Stakeholders of the Indonesian Capital Market (Jan. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2011/01/03/1555.html). 
29 Tabalujan, Why Corporate Governance Failed, supra note 25, at 145. 
30 Id. at 150. 
31 Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. 
FIN. ECON. 141, 142-43 (2000). 
32 Id. at 141-43. 
33 See generally Claessen et al., supra note 13 (“The separation of ownership and 
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As a result, since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the government has 
paid closer attention to reforming corporate governance rules and principles: 
the National Committee on Governance Policy (Komite Nasional Kebijakan 
Corporate Governance or KNKG) was established under the Coordinating 
Ministry of Economy in 1999 and governs Indonesian GCG policies.34 The 
KNKG follows the five pillars of GCG, which are essential to improving 
corporate governance practices in Indonesia: transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, independence, and fairness.35 Corporate governance reforms are 
contemplated in various statutes and procedures, including the general 
company law, securities regulations, banking laws, and public finance laws. In 
short, Indonesia has been striving to adopt fully corporate governance rules 
into its legal system. 
B. General Legal Framework 
The enactment of Law 8/1995, which replaced Law No. 15 of 1952 
(“Law 15/1952”), was Indonesia’s attempt to establish a modern legal 
foundation for its capital market, and was a response to the global market and 
the more sophisticated development of the global capital market industry.36 Its 
enactment was in keeping with the national strategy to boost economic growth 
and modernize the economy, as another major law, Law No. 1 of 1995 (“Law 
1/1995”) on Limited Liability Companies, was also enacted during the same 
period. Law 1/1995 was later updated and replaced by Law No. 40 of 2007 
(“Law 40/2007”).37 Two government regulations were enacted to equip Law 
8/1995 with operational procedures: Government Regulation No. 45 of 1995 
on the Operation of Capital Market Activities (“PP 45/1995”) and Government 
Regulation No. 46 of 1995 on Capital Market Investigation (“GR 46/1995”).38 
In addition, Law 8/1995 grants Bapepam-LK full authority to regulate the 
capital market, and Bapepam-LK since has reformed and improved Indonesian 
securities regulations through enacting technical regulations.39 Law 8/1995 
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control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms.”). 
34  See KOMITE NASIONAL KEBIJAKAN GOVERNANCE, PROFILE, available at 
http://www.knkg-indonesia.com/KNKG/index.asp?ID=AB.PR (detailing the history of 
the National Committee on Governance and its establishment). 
35  KOMITE NASIONAL KEBIJAKAN GOVERNANCE [NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON 
GOVERNANCE POLICY], PEDOMAN UMUM GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDONESIA 
[GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR INDONESIA GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 3 (2006). 
36 Law 8/1995 (Indon.). Pursuant to its elucidation, “Regulation of the Capital Market 
under Law 15 of 1952, “The Emergency Law on the Securities Exchange” included in 
the Statues of 1951 and 1952 (Books 79 and 67, respectively), is considered 
inadequate in today’s environment, it does not contain important capital market 
provisions, such as the adoption of the principle of full disclosure of material 
information in a Public Offering, and other essential public safeguards. In view of the 
rapid development of the economy and the globalization of business, the time is 
propitious for a new law on the capital market. 
37 See generally Law 40/2007 (Indon.) (concerning limited liability companies). 
38 Government Regulation No. 46/1995 (Indon.). 
39 At its inception in 1976, Bapepam supervised the market and served as the stock 
exchange simultaneously. In 1990, Bapepam’s role as the stock exchange was 
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serves as the lex generalis, or the general legal framework, for all capital 
market activity. However, issuers and investors who want to engage in 
Indonesian capital market activities must also pay attention to relevant lex 
specialis laws that govern specific sectors or industries, such as antitrust, 
foreign investment, banking, telecommunications, and mining. 
 
Law 8/1995 affects Indonesian capital market activities in four major 
ways. First, it establishes a framework for capital market activities by creating 
the instruments used by the participants, and defines the roles of the market 
players and supporting institutions. 40  Second, Law 8/1995 provides the 
foundation for GCG principles, which includes the disclosure principle, which 
protect public shareholders. 41  Third, Law 8/1995 introduces novel legal 
concepts to the Indonesian legal system, such as trusts,42 misappropriating 
inside information,43 which foster an “orderly, fair, and efficient” (teratur, 
wajar, dan efisien) capital market.44 
 
Fourth, Law 8/1995 establishes a new framework for the independent and 
adaptive institution of the Capital Market Supervisory Authority, Bapepam, 
which is the market regulator. 45  As such, Bapepam guides, regulates, 
supervises and approves day-to-day market activities, commences 
investigations (both administrative and criminal), and imposes sanctions.46 In 
December 2005, Bapepam was merged with the Directorate General of 
Financial Institutions to become Bapepam-LK, which also has the authority to 
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terminated and since then it has acted only as the regulator, further reaffirmed in Law 
8/1995. Ever since corporate governance reform began in Indonesia, Bapepam has 
issued new rules to meet this objective, including, but not limited to, improving 
disclosure requirements (Bapepam Regulation X.K.2 for financial reporting and X.K.6 
for annual reporting), conflict of interest (Bapepam Regulation IX.E.1), material 
transactions (Bapepam Regulation IX.E.2), rights issue (Bapepam Regulation IX.D.1), 
takeovers and public bids (Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 and IX.F.1). See History of 
Bapepam, Bapepam Online (Mar. 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.bapepam.go.id/old/profil/sejarah_bapepam.htm (providing a short history 
of the Bapepam). 
40 Law 8/1995 (Indon.) arts. 3-5 (providing rules and regulations dealing with the 
Bapepam); Law 8/1995 (Indon.) arts. 6-17 (covering the stock exchange, 
clearinghouse, and depository and settlement); Law 8/1995 (Indon.) arts. 30-42 
(covering securities companies and investment advisors);  Law 8/1995 (Indon.) arts. 
43-54 (covering supporting institutions, such as custodians, shares administrators, and 
trustees). 
41 Law 8/1995 art. 1(25), 75 (Indon.). 
42 The limited inclusion of the concept of “trust” in the securities regulatory regime 
can be inferred from the inclusion of a system of trustees (arts. 50-54), collective 
custody (art. 56), and the ability to have a mutual fund collective investment contract 
(art. 21), which involves a custodian bank as the trustee. Law 8/1995 (Indon.). 
43 Law 8/1995 arts. 90-9 (Indon.). 
44 Law 8/1995 art. 7(1) (stating that the stock exchange is established to implement a 
securities market that is orderly, fair, and efficient). 
45 Law 8/1995 arts. 3-5, 43-54, 64-9 (Indon.). 
46 Id. art. 3(1). 
2013]  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE INDONESIAN  93 
!
supervise the insurance and pension fund market.47 Further, in November 
2011, the Indonesian Parliament enacted Law No. 21 of 2011 (“Law 21/2011”) 
concerning Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), or the Financial Service Authority 
(FSA). Pursuant to Law 21/2011, FSA will become supervisor and regulator of 
the capital market and financial industry, the role currently held by Bapepam-
LK, and the banking industry, the role currently held by the Central Bank. As a 
result, Bapepam-LK will be replaced by the FSA as soon as the institution is 
set up. 
III. INDONESIAN SECURITIES LAW TAKEOVER REGULATIONS 
The takeover of a publicly listed company in Indonesia is subject to at 
least three legal regimes. First, takeover is another form of acquisition under 
basic company law, applicable to both privately held and publicly listed 
companies. Second, for publicly listed companies, the securities regulations 
enacted by the parliament, government, and Bapepam-LK, are applicable. 
Third, there may be particular industry-specific or other regulations. 
A. Indonesian General Company Law 
Law No. 40 of 2007 on the Limited Liability Company (“Law 
40/2007”) and implementing regulations, such as Government Regulation No. 
27 of 1998 on Mergers, Consolidation and Acquisition of Limited Liability 
Companies (“GR 27/1998”), provide the statutory framework for conducting 
business as a limited liability company. Before Law 40/2007 and its 
predecessor, Law 1/1995, the Indonesian Commercial Code (“ICC”) had 
governed since 1847, when Indonesia a colony of the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands East Indies Code of Commerce was promulgated.48 
 
Neither the ICC nor Law 1/1995 defines an “acquisition.” However, 
GR 27/1998 art. 1(3) defines an acquisition as “a legal action taken by a legal 
entity or an individual person to acquire all or most of the shares of a 
company, resulting in a change of control of the company.”49 Law 40/2007 art. 
1(11) defines acquisition as a “legal action taken by an entity, or an individual 
person, to acquire shares of a company resulting in a change of the controlling 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 On December 30, 2005, the Bapepam was merged with the Directorate General of 
Financial Institutions to become Bapepam-LK, and gained a supervisory role over the 
insurance and pension fund market. However the name Bapepam-LK is still frequently 
shortened to “Bapepam” in common usage. The organizational structure of the 
Bapepam-LK is available at  
http://www.bapepam.go.id/bapepamlk/organisasi/index.htm. 
48 The ICC was a translation of “Wetboek van Koophandel, Staatsblad” 1847:23, 
which prevailed as law after Indonesia became independent in 1945 pursuant to the 
Transitional Provision in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. In 1963, the Circular 
Letter of the Supreme Court No. 3 of 1963 states that the Indonesian Civil Code (as 
the basis for the Indonesian Commercial Code) is no longer legally binding and serves 
only as guidance for judges applying the law. SRI SOESILOWATI MAHDI, SURINI 
AHLAN SJARIF & AKHMAD BUDI CAHYONO, HUKUM PERDATA [CIVIL LAW] (SUATU 
PENGANTAR [AN INTRODUCTION]) 13 (2005). 
49 GR 27/1998 (Indon.). 
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power of a company.”50 Nonetheless, Felix Soebagjo, a scholar specializing in 
Indonesian commercial law, argues that a transfer of substantial assets, which 
results in a change in control of a company, can also be an acquisition.51 This 
is especially true of hard asset acquisitions that also involve the procurement 
of associated businesses and employees. In an asset transfer, the seller 
transfers the right to control the sold “assets” to the buyer of such assets. 
Therefore, certain procedures for an acquisition of assets are the same as those 
applicable to a transfer of shares.52 Law 40/2007 provides the rules for share 
transfers, adopting Articles 49 through 52 of Law 1/1995 with some minor 
revisions and additions.53 
 
Pursuant to Law 40/2007, an acquisition is described as a change of 
control54 caused by acquiring shares that have been issued and/or to be issued 
by the company either: (1) through the company’s board of directors, or (2) 
directly from the shareholders.55 Any legal entity or individual can acquire 
enough shares of a company to become its controlling shareholder,56 although 
such acquisition is subject to other regulatory requirements, such as 
restrictions on foreign ownership. 57  Standard legal procedures for share 
transfers apply to acquisitions through direct purchases from existing 
shareholders, such as share transfer procedures and any required third-party 
approvals.58 However, when an acquisition is conducted through the board of 
directors, the transaction must adhere to an “acquisition plan” created by the 
prospective acquirer and jointly approved by the board of the target 
company.59 
 
 As stated above, standard share transfer rules apply to direct 
acquisitions from the existing shareholders; specific rules are contained in a 
company’s articles of association. By law, the articles of association of a 
company must specify the method of transferring the rights over shares in 
accordance with the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.60 The board 
of directors records the day and date of such transfer in the shareholder register 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 The same definition of “acquisition” was present in the previous company law, Law 
1/1995 art. 103(2) (Indon.). 
51  FELIX OENTOENG SOEBAGJO, HUKUM TENTANG AKUISISI PERUSAHAAN DI 
INDONESIA [LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONSOLIDATION AND MERGER OF CORPORATIONS IN 
INDONESIA] 136 (Pusat Pengkajian Hukum, 2006).  
52 Id. 
53 Law 40/2007 arts. 48-62 (Indon.). 
54 Law 40/2007 art. 125(3) (Indon.). 
55 Law 40/2007 art. 125(1) (Indon.).  
56 Law 40/2007 art. 125(2) (Indon.). 
57 For example, Indonesia maintains a list that governs the maximum ownership in 
which a foreign entity can hold shares in an Indonesian company in various business 
sectors, pursuant to the Presidential Regulation regarding the negative investment list 
(the latest update of which is Presidential Regulation 36/2010 (Indon.). 
58 Law 40/2007 art. 125(8) (Indon.). 
59 Law 40/2007 arts. 125(5), (6) (Indon.) (mandating the need of an acquisition plan, 
and what must also be included in such a plan).  
60 Law 40/2007 art. 55 (Indon.). 
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or the special register,61 and by no later than thirty days from the record date of 
the said transfer, the Minister of Law and Human Rights must also be 
informed of the change in the composition of the shareholders of the company 
in the shareholder register.62 If the notification is not made within the given 
time frame, the Minister “may reject the application for approval or the 
notification conducted based on the composition and the names of 
shareholders which have not been notified.”63 
 
A company’s articles of association may prescribe requirements 
concerning transfers of rights over shares, including (a) mandatory prior offers 
to holders of a particular class of shares or other shareholders as a preemptive 
right;64 (b) mandatory prior approval from the company’s organs (i.e. GMS, 
board of directors and/or board of commissioners); 65 and/or (c) mandatory 
prior approval from the competent authority in accordance with provisions of 
any other applicable regulations that may pertain to specific situations.66 
Although mandatory prior approval applies to inheritance cases, these 
requirements generally do not apply if the transfer of shares is caused by an 
operation of law.67 
 
One essential and common feature in a company’s articles of 
association is a preemptive right provision, known as the right of first refusal, 
which is the obligation of a seller to offer their shares to the existing 
shareholders of the company before transferring such shares to a third party.68 
According to the law, when the articles of association require a selling 
shareholder to offer his/her shares to holders of shares with a particular 
classification or to the other shareholders, the offer stands for thirty days from 
the date the offer is made.69 If the other shareholders do not purchase the 
offered shares, the seller may offer and sell his/her shares to a third party.70 
The seller is entitled to withdraw the offer after the lapse of the thirty-day 
period.71 In addition, the seller is only required to offer the shares to other 
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61 Law 40/2007 arts. 50(1)-(2) (Indon.). 
62 Law 40/2007 art. 56(3) (Indon.). 
63 Law 40/2007 art. 56(4) (Indon.). 
64 Law 40/2007 art. 57(1)(a) (Indon.). 
65  Law 40/2007 art. 57(1)(b) (Indon.); see also Law 40/2007 art. 1(2) (Indon.) 
(defining “company organs”). The option as to which organ needs to approve such 
transfer will be governed in the respective articles of association. In keeping with their 
shared legal origins, the management of Indonesian companies, like their Dutch 
counterparts, is split between a board of managing directors and a board of 
“supervisory directors” called “commissioners” in Indonesia. 
66 Law 40/2007 art. 57(1)(c) (Indon.) 
67 Law 40/2007 art. 57(2) (Indon.) (revising Law 1/1995 art. 50 (Indon.)). 
68 See David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STANFORD JOURNAL OF 
LAW, BUSINESS, AND FINANCE, 1, 8-13 (1999); see generally Marcel Kahan, An 
Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal (New York University, Ctr. for Law & 
Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-99-009, 1999). 
69 Law 40/2007 art. 58(1) (Indon.) 
70 Id. 
71 Law 40/2007 art. 58(2) (Indon.). 
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shareholders prior to selling to a third party once.72 Sellers also must obtain 
approval of either the directors or the commissioners, as specified in its articles 
of association. Such approval or refusal must be given within ninety days and, 
once the time period has lapsed, the board must be deemed to have approved 
the share transfer.73 
 
 Finally, Indonesian company law requires a quorum in the GMS. A 
GMS to approve an acquisition may be held only if at least three quarters of all 
shares with voting rights are present or represented, and the resolution will be 
lawful only if at least three quarters of the votes validly cast at the meeting 
approve it.74 However, Law 40/2007 provides that a company’s articles of 
association may require a higher quorum, a greater requirement for adoption of 
the GMS resolution, or both.75 Specific rules apply to share transfers that are 
subject to securities regulations.76 For example, in the acquisition of a public 
company, the target public company is not obligated to obtain approval from a 
GMS to be acquired, unless other laws and regulations specific to the 
company’s line of business otherwise require such approval.77 This rule was 
made to avoid doubt as to whether the provisions in Law 40/2007 or Bapepam-
LK policy were applicable. Thus, although the general company law is 
applicable to both privately held and publicly listed companies, publicly listed 
companies are also subject to securities regulations that may prescribe 
additional requirements or set aside provisions in the company law. 
B. Indonesian Securities Regulations 
Basic Concepts and Definitions 
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 governs takeovers of public 
companies in Indonesia is governed. Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 was enacted 
in 2000, amended in 2002, 2008, and the current law is the 2011 amendment.78 
Regulation IX.H.1 is related to the tender offer rule, known as a voluntary 
public bid, which is governed by the 2011 amended version of Bapepam 
Regulation IX.F.1,.79 The 2011 amendments of Regulation IX.H.1 and IX.F.180 
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72 Law 40/2007 art. 58(3) (Indon.). 
73 Law 40/2007 arts. 59(1)-(2) (Indon.). 
74 Law 40/2007 art. 89 (Indon.). 
75 Law 40/2007 art. 89(1) (Indon.). 
76 Law 40/2007 art. 56(5) (Indon.). 
77 Bapepam Rule IX.H.1 art. 3(2)(b) (2011) (Indon.). 
78 Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 was first enacted in the Decree of Head of Bapepam 
No. Kep-04/PM/2000 dated March 13, 2000 on the Takeover of Public Companies 
[hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2000], and then amended and replaced 
by the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. Kep-05/PM/2002 dated April 3, 2002 on the 
Takeover of Public Companies [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2002]. A 
significant change was made by Bapepam-LK, by virtue of the Decree of Head of 
Bapepam-LK No. Kep-259/BL/2008 dated June 20, 2008 on the Takeover of Public 
Companies [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008]. Various new 
instruments were introduced in this Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008, the most 
important of which was the mandatory selling requirement. 
79 Bapepam Regulation IX.F.1 was first contemplated under Decree of Head of 
Bapepam No. Kep-10/PM/2000 on Tender Offer dated March 13, 2000 [hereinafter 
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make clear distinctions between the rules on takeovers and mandatory bids 
(Bapepam Rule IX.H.1 2011) and the rule on voluntary bids (Bapepam Rule 
IX.F.1 2011), although both regulations share similar principles. 
 
 Each version of Regulation No. IX.H.1 sets forth a similar definition 
of a takeover: Takeover means “an activity, either directly or indirectly, that 
cause any change in a [c]ompany’s control.”81 Under this definition, the three 
essential elements of a takeover are: (1) there is an activity (or action); (2) the 
activity (or action) can be exercised either directly or indirectly; and (3) the 
activity (or action) causes a change in company control. The broad definition 
of an “activity” can cover any activity including a voluntary public bid. 
However, since there is no precedent for a voluntary bid causing a change of 
control of a company in Indonesia, the term “activity” has in practice meant a 
takeover resulting from share acquisitions. 
 
In the above definition, the concept of “control” is a key factor in 
determining whether a takeover has occurred in Indonesia. Bapepam 
Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2002) defines “company controller” as any person 
who: 
 
1) owns 25% (twenty five percent) of a Company’s shares or 
more, unless that person could prove that he does not control the 
company, or 2) any person that directly or indirectly has the ability 
to control a Company in a manner of: a) determining the 
designation and resignation of directors and commissioners; or b) 
making any changes in the Company’s Article of Association.82 
 
This amended the previous Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1. (2000), in which 
the threshold for being a company controller was 20% ownership. Meanwhile, 
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 of 2008 and 2011 both define “company 
controller” as “any person who owns 50% of a company’s paid-up shares or 
more, or any person who directly or indirectly has the ability to determine in 
any way whatsoever the management and/or policy of the public company.”83  
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Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 (2000)] and further amended by Decree of Head of 
Bapepam No. Kep-04/PM/2002 on Tender Offer dated April 3, 2002 [hereinafter 
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 (2002)]. 
80 Bapepam-LK updated these two regulations by issuing: (i) the Decree of Head of 
Bapepam No. 264/BL/2011 dated 31 May 2011 on the Takeover of Public Companies 
[hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2011] amending Bapepam Regulation 
No. IX.H.1 2008; and (ii) the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. 263/BL/2011 dated 31 
May 2011 concerning Voluntary Tender Offer [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. 
IX.F.1 2011] amending the Rule IX.F.1 2002. 
81 See, e.g., Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(e) (2002) (Indon.), Bapepam 
Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(e) (2008) (Indon.), and Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 
art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon.). 
82 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.). 
83 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. 
IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2008) (Indon.). 
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Based on the above, determining whether a shareholder is a company 
controller can be done through the formal shareholding composition, the 
quantitative approach, or the actual control of the company, the qualitative 
approach. First, if using the formal shareholding composition (quantitative) 
approach, there have been increases from twenty to twenty-five then to fifty 
percent in the ownership threshold. The increase of this threshold is intended 
to enhance market liquidity and provide wider access for investors acquiring 
shares in the Indonesian stock market.84 The takeover regulation imposes 
requirements on any potential acquirer for disclosures, regulatory approvals, 
and mandatory tender offers, etc. that might be burdensome for companies if 
their corporate actions constitute a takeover. Therefore, from a potential 
acquirer’s perspective, the threshold’s increase allows more corporate takeover 
activity. The 2002 Regulation has a caveat for the twenty-five percent 
threshold; namely, the act constitutes a takeover, “unless the person could 
prove that he does not control the company.”85 Under this Regulation, the 
acquirer has the burden of proving that the shares to be acquired will not result 
in company control. This caveat was deleted after the threshold was increased 
to fifty percent or more under the 2008 and 2011 Regulations. 
 
Second, the qualitative approach, unlike the quantitative approach, 
determines who has de facto control of the company without regard to the 
formal shareholding composition. The 2002 Regulation’s definition of control 
encompasses “any person that directly or indirectly has the ability to control a 
company in the manner of: (a) determining the designation and resignation of 
members of the board of directors and commissioners; or (b) making any 
changes in the Company’s Article of Association.”86 However, the 2008 and 
2011 Regulations broaden the definition by adding the provision that “any 
person that directly or indirectly has the ability to determine in any way 
whatsoever the management and/or policy of the public company” is 
considered a company controller.87 The discussion of qualitative control relates 
to the fact that a takeover can be a direct or indirect activity. By introducing 
the concept of “indirect control,” all Regulations (2002, 2008, and 2011) have 
attempted to cover parties who are not necessarily registered as the company’s 
shareholder but can still exercise control over the company. For example, the 
indirect control provisions may apply to an “ultimate controller”—a person 
who may not own shares, but can control, determine, and greatly influence the 
company’s decisions, although the Regulations do not explicitly reference this 
concept.88 
 
The 2000, 2002, 2008, and 2011 versions of Regulation IX.H.1 
provide different definitions of a “person” who may be a controlling person 
that consequently is compelled to make a mandatory offer. A person can be “a 
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84 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 consideration (a) (2008) (Indon.). 
85 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.) (emphasis added). 
86 Id. 
87 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. 
IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2008) (Indon.). 
88 For a discussion concerning beneficial/ultimate ownership across jurisdictions, 
including Indonesia, see Vermeulen, supra note 13. 
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natural person, a company [perusahaan], a legal entity, a partnership, an 
association, or any Organized Group.” 89  “Natural person” refers to an 
individual. Meanwhile, a company can be in any legally recognized profit-
seeking form, including that of a limited liability company, and it can be either 
a local or foreign entity. 
 
Mandatory Offer 
When a transaction is considered to be a takeover, the party taking 
over the company is required to conduct a tender offer. Under Bapepam 
Regulation No. IX.F.1 (2002), “Tender Offer means an offer through the mass 
media to acquire equity securities by purchase or exchange with other 
Securities.”90 Pursuant to the most recent amendments in Bapepam Regulation 
Rule No. IX.H.1 (2011), a mandatory tender offer no longer refers to Bapepam 
Regulation Rule No. IX.F.1 (2011), which pertains exclusively to voluntary 
tender offers (discussed further below). As contemplated in the 2000, 2002, 
2008, and 2011 versions of Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1, in the event of a 
company takeover, the new controller of the company must conduct a 
mandatory tender offer for all remaining shares of the company. The shares 
that must be purchased by the new controller are the shares owned by 
shareholders prior to the announcement date of the proposed tender. However, 
this requirement comes with several exceptions. Under Bapepam Regulation 
No. IX.H.1 (2011), the following shares are excepted from the mandatory 
tender offer: 
 
a) shares owned by shareholders who have made an Takeover 
transaction with the new Controller;  
b) shares owned by other Parties who have obtained an offer 
with the same terms and conditions from the new 
Controller;  
c) shares owned by other Parties who at the same time also 
conduct a Mandatory Tender Offer or Voluntary Tender 
Offer for the shares in the same Publicly-Listed Company; 
d) shares owned by the Ultimate Shareholder; and 
e) shares owned by the other Controller of the Publicly-Listed 
Company.91 
 
The mandatory tender offer requirement does not apply to a takeover 
as a result of certain legal actions. The Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008 
and 2011 versions provide that the following actions do not trigger the 
mandatory tender offer requirement: 
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89 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(b) (2008) (Indon.). 
90 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.). 
91 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (3)(a)(2) (2011) (Indon.). These provisions have 
also been incorporated in the previous Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2002) and 
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2008) (Indon.). See also Bapepam Regulation No. 
IX.F.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (describing “Substantial Shareholder” as any Person that 
directly or indirectly owns at least 20% of the voting rights of a company’s issued 
shares). 
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1) The Takeover occurs due to marriage or inheritance;  
2) The Takeover is performed by a Party who previously has no 
share in the Publicly-Listed Company and the Takeover occurs 
due to purchase or Takeover of the shares in the Publicly-
Listed Company within every 12 (twelve)-month period, in a 
maximum amount of 10% (ten percent) of total outstanding 
shares with valid voting rights;  
3) The Takeover occurs due to the performance of duties and 
authority of a government or state body or institution based on 
the laws; 
4) The Takeover occurs due to the direct purchase of the shares 
owned and/or controlled by a government or state body or 
institution as the implementation of the provision as intended 
in point 3);  
5) The Takeover occurs due to a court stipulation or decision 
having permanent legal force;  
6) The Takeover occurs due to a merger, spin-off, consolidation, 
or liquidation of a shareholder;  
7) The Takeover occurs due to a grant constituting a transfer or 
shares without any agreement to obtain compensation in any 
form whatsoever; 
8) The Takeover occurs due to the existence of a certain debt 
guarantee stipulated in a loan agreement, and a debt guarantee 
in the context of the restructuring of the Publicly-Listed 
Company stipulated by a government or a state body or 
institution based on the laws;  
9) The Takeover occurs due to share Takeover as the 
implementation of Regulation Number IX.D.1 and Regulation 
Number IX.D.4; 92  
10) The Takeover occurs due to the implementation of the policies 
of a government or state body or institution;  
11) The Mandatory Tender Offer that, if implemented, will be 
contradictory to laws and regulation; and  
12) The Takeover occurs due to the implementation of a Voluntary 
Tender Offer based on Regulation Number IX.F.1.93 
 
Creeping Purchase Rule 
A transaction is excluded from the mandatory tender offer requirement 
if it is conducted gradually within the period of one year, with certain 
limitations. This is called the “creeping share purchase rule.” Under the 2002 
Regulations, that the mandatory tender offer requirement does not apply to the 
purchase or acquisition of shares within a twelve month period, “in the amount 
of up to five percent of the outstanding shares with valid voting rights.”94 
Meanwhile, the 2008 and 2011 Regulations increased the five percent 
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92  Bapepam Regulation No.IX.D.1 governs pre-emptive rights, while Bapepam 
Regulation No.IX.D.4 governs capital increases without pre-emptive rights. 
93 Bapepam Regulation No. X.H.1 art. 15 (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation 
IX.H.1 art. 6(a) (2011) (Indon.).  
94 See Bapepam Regulation No. X.H.1 art. 11(b) (2002) (Indon.). 
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threshold to ten percent of the outstanding shares with valid voting rights.95 As 
a result, an annual purchase of shares of up to ten percent does not trigger a 
mandatory tender offer.96 However, since  a shareholder of a public company 
who owns more than 5% of the shares is required to disclose its identity, the 
price it paid for the shares, and its intention for buying the shares,97 the other 
shareholders should not be surprised if there is a change of control caused by a 
creeping purchase. 
 
Free Float Shares (In a Mandatory Offer) 
Free float shares are those retained by public investors in the stock 
exchange following a mandatory tender offer. Float shares are those available 
for daily trading in the stock exchange. Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2008) 
introduced new rules regarding obligations to resell shares to maintain the 
availability of float shares in the event of a takeover that triggers a mandatory 
tender offer. Under the 2008 Regulations, when a takeover, or a mandatory 
tender offer following a takeover, results in the new controller owning more 
than 80% of the company’s shares, the new controller must transfer or float at 
least 20% of the shares back to the public and the company must be owned by 
at least 300 parties within two years of the offer.98 The company is exempt 
from this requirement if it carries out certain corporate actions that meet the 
regulatory objective.99 Such corporate action may include a rights issue or an 
issuance of new shares through private placement, in which case there is no 
obligation to release the shares because new shares are available for trading, 
meeting the regulatory objective of making the shares available for the 
public.100 This rule is expected to increase market liquidity and provide greater 
opportunity for public investors to own shares of the public company after a 
takeover. 101  In addition, Bapepam-LK may have established this rule to 
prevent the use of tender offers as a way to “go private” or delist a company 
from the stock exchange.102  
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95 See Bapepam Regulation No. X.H.1 art. 15(b) (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation 
IX.H.1 art. 6(a)(2) (2011) (Indon.). 
96 Suppose A is one of the shareholders of PT XYZ, Tbk, holding 21% (twenty one 
percent) of its shares. Within each of the following three years, A bought 10% (ten 
percent) of the shares of the company from other shareholders of the company, until at 
the end of the third year, the final shareholding composition of A was 51% (fifty one 
percent). As a holder of 51% (fifty one percent) of shares of the company, A would 
become a controlling shareholder, through its share ownership creeping upwards at the 
rate of 10% (ten percent) per annum. 
97 Bapepam Regulation No. X.M.1 (1996) (Indon.) (regulating the disclosure of 
information of certain shareholders). 
98 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 arts. 3-4 (2008) (Indon.). 
99 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 5(c) (2008) (Indon.). 
100 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 5 (c) (2008) (Indon.). 
101 Mark Nelson & Ahmad Assegaf, Indonesia Takeover Rules: Lower Thresholds, 
Fewer Deals, ASIA L. (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.asialaw.com/Article/2004989/Indonesia-takeover-rules-lower-thresholds-
fewer-deals.html?Print=true&Single=true. 
102 Decision to be voluntarily delisted in the stock exchange is a corporate decision that 
does not require Bapepam approval. There is also the possibility of delisting by virtue 
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 The introduction of the new sell-down rule is legally and 
commercially problematic. An acquirer who is legally obligated to purchase 
shares because of a mandatory tender offer will be forced to sell the shares 
after two years. In addition, the acquirer will be forced to dump the shares in 
the market at a discounted price if it cannot sell them within the two-year 
period. This will affect the price of the shares held by the shareholders, which 
will disproportionately affect the controlling shareholders because of their high 
percentage ownership103 This rule prompted the Malaysian Central Bank to 
revoke the approval it granted to the Malaysian-based Malayan Banking 
Berhad (Maybank) when it initiated a plan to acquire a controlling stake in PT 
Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk (BII) because the forced sell-down 
requirement could decrease Maybank’s investment value. 104  Maybank’s 
approval was reinstated after Bapepam promised to relax the requirement if the 
sell-down would adversely impact BII’s share price.105 
 
 In response, the 2011 updated version of Bapepam Regulation No. 
IX.H.1 (2011) stipulates the conditions under which Bapepam-LK can prolong 
the time period for the mandatory sell down of shares to relax the sell-down 
requirements. The time extension may be given if: 
 
1) the Composite Share Price Index (IHSG) on the Stock Exchange 
decreases by more than 10% (ten percent) in 3 (three) consecutive 
exchange days;  
2) the Stock Exchange on which the Publicly-Listed Company’s 
shares are listed and traded is closed; 
3) the trading of the Publicly-Listed Company’s shares on the Stock 
Exchange is stopped;  
4) natural disaster, war, riot, fire, and/or strike that significantly 
affect the business continuity of the Publicly-Listed Company;  
5) the share price during the retransfer period is never equal to or 
higher than the price of the Mandatory Tender Offer; and/or 
6) the new Controller has made efforts to retransfer the shares but the 
obligation as intended in letter a and/or letter b is not fulfilled.106 
 
Offer Price 
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of the order of the stock exchange. See, e.g., IDX Rule I-I on Delisting and Relisting 
of Securities in Stock Exchange (2004) (Indon.). 
103 See Rachel Evans, Indonesian Regulator Admits Takeover Mistakes, ASIA L. (Dec. 
2008), available at  
http://www.asialaw.com/Article/2068033/Channel/16959/Indonesian-regulator-
admits-takeover-mistakes.html. 
104 Niluksi Koswanage, Malaysia's Maybank Says Approval for BII Buy Revoked, 
REUTERS (July 29, 2008, 12:44 PM), available at  
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/07/29/maybank-idUKWNA448920080729. 
105 Soo Ai Peng, Update 1-Malaysia Maybank Says BII Deal Approval Reinstated, 
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2008, 1:53 PM), available at  
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/16/maybank-idUKKLR15263920080916. 
106 See Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 5(d) (2011) (Indon.). 
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Price formulation is another main issue in the Indonesian regulations 
on mandatory offers. The price of a mandatory offer is essential in takeover 
regulations because the public must receive the same price as that which the 
acquirer offered to the controlling shareholder. In principle, there is a general 
shift from determining offer price by the “highest price” to the “average 
highest price” approach. At first, Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2000) does not 
distinguish between the prices for direct and indirect takeovers.107 However, 
the general rule is that the price is determined by the highest share price within 
a certain period.108 Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2002), which has adopted the 
same approach, improved this rule by providing requirements differentiating 
between direct and indirect takeovers for determining the price of the tender 
offer.109 Despite the distinction, both direct and indirect takeover will cause a 
mandatory tender offer, the price of which is set pursuant to the highest price 
within the last 90 days prior to the date of the announcement of the deal. 
 
 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2008) and (2011) significantly 
amended the previous regulations by adopting the average highest price rule.110 
The 2011 Regulation states that the price is the higher of (a) the average of the 
highest daily trading prices on the ISX within the ninety-day period before the 
announcement of the tender offer or the negotiation and (b) the takeover price. 
111 This amends the 2002 Regulation, in which the price was the higher of (a) 
the highest trading price on ISX within the ninety-day period before the 
negotiation announcement and (b) the takeover price.112 In 2011, Bapepam 
synchronized the rule concerning voluntary tender offers by adopting the 
average highest price approach. Therefore, the rules for mandatory and 
voluntary public bids use the average highest price of the traded stocks.113 
 
There are at least two significant changes in the new rules. First, the 
announcement date under the 2008 Regulation can be made either at the 
commencement of negotiation that may result in a takeover or at the 
completion of the takeover deal. This affects the price of the tender offer and, 
therefore, acquirers must decide strategically when to announce the deal, and 
contemplate how it may affect the tender offer price. Second, the 2008 
Regulation adopts the “average highest price” standard instead of the “highest 
price” standard. This approach reduces the price for a tender offer, which 
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107 See generally Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2000) (showing that no distinction is 
made that differentiates by price regardless of whether there is a direct versus indirect 
takeover). 
108 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 7 (2000) (Indon.). 
109 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 8 (2002) (Indon.). 
110 See Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 art. 12 (2008), which is further adopted in 
Bapepam Rule IX.H.1 art. 4(c) (2011) (Indon.). 
111 Bapepam Rule IX.H.1 art. 4(c) (2011) (Indon.). 
112 Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 art. 8 (2002) (Indon.). 
113 Bapepam Regulation IX.F.1 art. 4(a)–(b) (2011) (Indon.) (setting the average price 
of the voluntary tender offer as the higher between the offeror’s last bid, the average 
highest price at the stock changes ninety days prior to the announcement, the average 
highest price within twelve months prior to the last trading day of such shares, or a 
reasonable price determined by an appraiser). 
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arguably can encourage a more active takeover market since potential 
acquirers prefer lower prices. In addition, he highest price standard can reduce 
the chance of market manipulation to create an artificially high price for tender 
offers by leaking inside information. While information leakage is difficult to 
monitor in Indonesia, the tender offer price is determined by the average 
highest price and, therefore, averaging the highest price can disperse the 
impact of leaked information. 
 
Negotiation and Timing 
An important consideration with respect to the takeover of a public 
company and its subsequent mandatory tender offer requirement is when to 
disclose the process to the general public. Such information is crucial because 
the public will react to the takeover plan, and such reaction will affect the 
share price. If the public views the takeover plan positively, the share price 
may increase. Conversely, if the public views the takeover negatively, the 
price of the shares may go down. Therefore, the decision to disclose the 
takeover plan may impact the price of the shares as well as the price of the 
mandatory tender offer. 
 
Pursuant to the 2000 and 2002 Regulations, when a potential acquirer 
commences takeover negotiations it must disclose the process even though the 
deal might fall through. 114  How is the “start” of a negotiation to be 
determined? The Regulations did not explain whether a short verbal 
conversation between a director of a prospective company and a director of a 
prospective target company constitutes “the start of negotiations,” or whether 
it had to be done in a more formal way, such as the signing of a memorandum 
of understanding. 
 
The 2008 and 2011 versions of Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 
introduced more flexibility into the timing of a takeover announcement. Since 
the provision regarding the announcement at the start of the negotiation is 
optional rather than mandatory,115 a prospective controller may announce a 
mandatory offer upon the completion of an acquisition of a controlling 
interest. This flexibility allows the acquirer to choose whether to announce the 
mandatory tender offer during the negotiation stage or wait until the 
completion of the takeover. The acquirer must consider the effect of its 
disclosure strategy on the share price in order to obtain the best value. For 
instance, if the acquirer announces the takeover and subsequent plan of a 
mandatory tender offer at the negotiation stage, the share price of such 
mandatory tender offer will then be calculated (locked) based on such date and 
it will be easier for the acquirer to predict and determine the tender offer price. 
However, if the announcement of a mandatory tender offer is made only after 
the completion of a takeover, share price might increase sharply, which in turn 
might increase the price of the mandatory tender offer shares pursuant to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 art. 3 (2000) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 
art. 4 (2002) (Indon.). 
115 Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 art. 7 (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 
arts. 2(a)-(d) (2011) (Indon.). 
2013]  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE INDONESIAN  105 
!
regulation. Therefore, the acquirer must consider when to disclose the 
information. 
 
If a prospective candidate announces a plan to conduct a takeover at 
the start of a negotiation, every subsequent material development in the 
negotiations must be reported on a regular basis, and at the latest at the end of 
the second day after such a development occurs.116 The mandatory tender offer 
must commence no later than the end of the second business day after the 
company takeover occurs, 117  or at the latest 180 days after the 
announcement.118 
 
Anti-Takeover Defense 
Regulations concerning anti-takeover measures are relevant to hostile 
takeovers, that is, public offers proceeding without the consent of the board of 
directors of the target company. Hostile offers have not been practiced in 
Indonesia because most takeover deals were preceded by share acquisitions 
that led to mandatory tender offers.119 However, in the event of a voluntary 
tender offer, pursuant to Bapepam-LK Regulation IX.F.1 (2011), a statement 
supporting or discouraging a voluntary offer may be made by the target 
company, an affiliate of the target company, a competing offeror, or those who 
disclose information or express professional opinions.120 In addition, the board 
of directors or board of commissioners of the target company can issue a 
written statement, but only if there is evidence that the information contained 
in the offer statement is incorrect or deceiving.121 Both of these types of 
statements must be published in two nationwide newspapers at least ten days 
before the end of the voluntary tender offer period.122 Finally, there is a general 
prohibition against the target company carrying out any deal or activity that 
might frustrate the voluntary tender offer during the offer period,123 but there is 
no concrete list of what constitutes such action. 
 
The Role of the Supervisory Authority 
The competent supervisory authority of the Indonesian capital market 
is Bapepam-LK, which authority, as of December 31, 2012, has been 
transferred to OJK.124 During its administration, Bapepam-LK has played an 
effective role in supervising the Indonesian capital market. With regard to 
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116 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.I. art. 4 (2002) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. 
IX.H.I. art. 8 (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.I. art. 2(b) (2011) 
(Indon.). 
117 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 3 (2002) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. 
IX.H.1 art. 6 (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 4(a)(4) (2011) 
(Indon.). 
118 Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.I. art. 4, 7 (2002) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. 
IX.H.I. art. 11 (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.I. art. 4(d) (2011) 
(Indon.). 
119 See supra note 18 (regarding the number of takeover deals in Indonesia).  
120 Bapepam-LK Regulation IX.F.1 art. 3(a) (2011) (Indon.). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. art. 3(c). 
123 Id. art. 5(o). 
124 Supra text accompanying note 53. 
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administrative authority and criminal investigative role over market 
participants, there is no significant change made by shifting authority from 
Bapepam-LK to the OJK or the Indonesian FSA. Law 21/2011 concerning the 
OJK mostly revises the governance structure (i.e. nomination and 
accountability) to establish regulatory independence. 125  At present, the 
authority governing the capital market pursuant to the new OJK governance is 
no longer under the government’s finance ministry; rather, OJK is an 
independent entity, the members of which are selected by the parliament.  As a 
regulator, Bapepam-LK/OJK retains regulatory authority, administrative 
enforcement authority, and, to a certain extent, criminal investigation 
authority. 
 
First, as part of its administrative authority, Bapepam-LK/OJK can 
commence an administrative inquiry to maintain the integrity of the market. It 
can do so by requesting information from market participants, gathering and 
collecting documentary evidence, or instructing that market participants take 
certain actions to settle conflicts in the market. If a market participant fails to 
comply with the rules set out by Bapepam-LK, the institution has the power to 
impose administrative sanctions. Bapepam-LK/OJK has authority to approve 
both mandatory and voluntary public offers and its relevant requirements, such 
as price setting and the sell down rule,126  and supervise all information 
disclosed during the process.127 
 
Second, Bapepam-LK/OJK can impose the following administrative 
sanctions: written warnings, monetary fines, limitations on business activities, 
suspensions of business activities, revocations of business licenses, 
annulments of approval, and annulments of registration.128 Third, pursuant to 
Law 8/1995 art. 101(3), Bapepam-LK, as transferred to OJK, can serve as a 
criminal investigator with the authority (1) to receive reports, notices, or 
complaints regarding potential criminal activities; (2) to investigate the 
validity of reports regarding crimes in the capital market; (3) to investigate 
certain individuals considered to be alleged perpetrators of crimes; (4) to 
subpoena, request statements, and gather information or collect evidence 
regarding crimes; (5) to conduct investigations in any place deemed to have 
stored evidence on accounts, statements, or any document, and to seize them to 
serve as evidence of a crime; (6) to request expert statements; and (7) to 
commence and terminate the investigation procedure.129 
C. Other Relevant Regulations 
A takeover is subject to legal regimes other than the basic company 
law and securities regulations. Shareholders that are foreign entities are 
governed under the foreign investment law and sector-specific regulations and 
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125 Law 21/2011 art. 1(1) (2011) (Indon.) (reaffirming regulatory independence and 
non-interference from any other institution). 
126 See, e.g., Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 arts. 3, 4 (2011) (Indon.). 
127 Id. 
128 Law 8/1995 art. 102(2) (1995) (Indon.). 
129 Law 8/1995 art. 101(3) (1995) (Indon.). 
2013]  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE INDONESIAN  107 
!
my face foreign investment restrictions. In addition, takeover deals are subject 
to competition laws and employment laws. 
 
Foreign Investment Restrictions 
 Foreign direct investment in Indonesia is regulated by Law No. 25 of 
2007 on Investment (“Law 25/2007”) and its implementing regulations, which 
were issued by the Investment Coordinating Board (“BKPM”) in accordance 
with its mandate. BKPM is the appointed regulator of direct investments in 
Indonesia, has focused mainly on government efforts to promote investment, 
as well as to regulate and resolve investment issues in Indonesia.130 
 
Recently, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 36 of 
2010, which determines what business sectors are open or closed to foreign 
investors and, if open, to what extent Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) is 
permitted—also known as the “Negative List”.131 The new Negative List is the 
first and most important regulation, which any foreign investor contemplating 
investment in Indonesia must consult.132 If the companies participating in the 
contemplated merger and acquisition (“M&A”) have business fields listed on 
the Negative List as being closed to foreign investment, the foreign investor 
cannot invest in such field in Indonesia. However, if the business is one that is 
“conditionally” open to foreign investment, investment is permitted but the 
contemplated M&A is limited by the restriction on share ownership as 
provided by the Negative List.133  
 
Most private foreign investments in Indonesia are administered and 
supervised by the BKPM, which inter alia administers the application of the 
Negative List to foreign investment approvals. Most matters relevant to M&A 
transactions must be reported to, and require obtaining approval from, the 
Chairman of the BKPM. In addition, Bapepam-LK regulates publicly listed 
companies. However, unlike shares regulated under the foreign direct 
investment scheme, shares traded on the capital market are not classified by 
their holders, regardless of whether they are local or foreign parties. 134 
However, in practice there has been uncertainty about when a tender offer 
obligation did not follow the Negative List ownership requirements.135 
 
Competition Law 
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130 Law 25/2007 art 28 (1) (2007) (Indon.) (on the role of BKPM in Indonesia’s 
investment governance). 
131 Presidential Regulation 36/2010 app. I (Indon.) [hereinafter Pres. Reg. 36/2010]. 
132 See Law 25/2007 art. 12 (Indon.). 
133 Law 25/2007 art. 12 (Indon.); Pres. Reg. 36/2010 arts. (1)-(2) (Indon.). 
134 Pres. Reg. 36/2010 art. 4 (Indon.). 
135 See, e.g., Press Release, Indosat, Tender Offer Plan by Qatar Telecom (QTEL) 
Q.S.C. with Respect to Shares of PT Indosat TBK (July 2, 2008), available at 
http://www.indosat.com/template/media/editor/content/TENDER%20OFFER%20REL
EASE.pdf; see also Qtel to begin coordinated tender offer for PT Indosat TBK, 
ARABIAN BUS. (Apr. 13, 2013), 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/press_releases/detail/36012 (concerning the debate as 
to whether tender offer of Qtel is limited to only 65% pursuant to the negative 
investment list rule). 
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 Certain provisions of Law No. 5 of 1999 on the Ban of Monopolistic 
Practices and Unfair Business Practices (“Law 5/1999” or “Antimonopoly 
Law”) deal specifically with mergers and acquisitions. Pursuant to Article 28 
of Law 5/1999, mergers and acquisitions are prohibited in Indonesia if they 
result in monopolistic or unfair trade practices. Therefore, all efforts must be 
made to ensure that any contemplated M&A transaction does not give rise to a 
monopolistic or unfair trade or business practice. Law 5/1999 uses the 50% 
market share standard as presumptive of a monopoly,136 the 75% market share 
as presumptive of an oligopoly,137 and 50% individual market share or 75% 
group market share as determinative of a dominant position, unless the party 
with the shares does not abuse their dominant position.138 The Indonesian 
competition authority, the KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha), is 
responsible for supervising market competition and anti-competitive behavior 
in Indonesia.139 
 
In July 2010, the Indonesian government issued Government 
Regulation No. 57 of 2010 on the Merger or Consolidation and Acquisition of 
Enterprise Share, which may Result in Monopolistic Practices and Unfair 
Business Competition (“GR 57/2010”). GR 57/2010 provides the basic legal 
framework for competition laws applicable to M&A transactions. Since then, 
the KPPU has issued several rules (“KPPU Rules”), per the mandate of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law,140  which contain amended provisions relating to the 
consultation and pre-notification requirements for M&A transactions. 
Previously, there was only a voluntary pre-notification process for the parties 
involved in an M&A. Under GR 57/2010 and the procedures under the KPPU 
Rules, the voluntary pre-notification process has been replaced with a 
required, pre-transaction consultation procedure and a more stringent thirty-
day post-notification requirement after completion of the contemplated deal.141 
 
GR 57/2010 states that such post-notification requirement must be 
fulfilled by a company conducting any M&A transaction in which the 
combined total value of assets of the companies concerned is more than 2.5 
trillion Rupiah, or in which the combined total turnover of the companies 
concerned is more than 5 trillion Rupiah. 142  Furthermore, GR 57/2010 
stipulates that a Bank conducting an M&A transaction is required to submit a 
post-notification of such transaction to the KPPU if the total value of assets of 
the bank concerned is more than 20 trillion Rupiah.143 Noncompliance with 
this requirement will give result in the imposition of administrative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 Law 5/1999 art. 17(2)(c) (Indon.). 
137 Law 5/1999 art. 4(2) (Indon.). 
138 Law 5/1999 arts. 25(2)(a)-(b) (Indon.). 
139 Law 5/1999 arts. 30-37 (Indon.). 
140 For example, in 2010, the KPPU issued KPPU Rule No. 10 of 2010, No. 11 of 2010 
and No. 13 of 2010. KPPU Rule No. 10/2010 and No. 13/2010 have been revoked and 
replaced by KPPU Rule 10/2011, as further amended by KPPU Rule 3/2012. 
141 GR 57/2010 arts. 5(1), 10 (Indon.). 
142 GR 57/2010 art. 5(2) (Indon.). 
143 Id. art. 5(3). 
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penalties.144 As a result, after receiving such post-notification, the KPPU will 
conduct an assessment and determine whether the M&A transaction violates 
the Antimonopoly Law, using the market concentration, market entry barriers, 
potential for unfair trade behavior, efficiency, and/or bankruptcy criteria.145 
 
 While the KPPU’s opinion is not binding, under Article 47(2)(e) of 
Law 5/1999, the KPPU has authority to cancel an M&A transaction if such 
transaction has elements of monopolistic or unfair trade practices.146 Hence, 
potential acquirers contemplating takeover transactions should conduct and 
file a consultation with the KPPU prior to the completion of a contemplated 
transaction to limit the cancellation risk. 
 
Employment Law 
 Law No. 13 of 2003 on Employment (“Law 13/2003”) provides the 
framework for employee and employer rights during an M&A.147 In theory, 
since an M&A is related only to a change in ownership of or control over a 
company, it does not affect the employees’ status. In practice, an employee 
may continue working for the company after an acquisition if the post-
transaction company prolongs or renews the employee’s work contract. If the 
contract is renewed, the employee will be terminated from the company pre-
transaction and re-hired by the surviving company under new terms and 
conditions. 
 
 If an employee does not wish to be employed by the surviving company, 
he or she has the right to refuse new employment. Thus, an employee can 
resign from the company and be entitled to receive a special severance 
payment, long service payment package, and/or other compensation, such as 
unused annual leave or housing allowance.148 Law 13/2003 does not specify 
the ownership percentage that triggers these entitlements; rather, it refers to a 
change of ownership.149 Further, Law 13/2003 is silent on whether the change 
of control is only direct, or whether it includes indirect changes of control.150 
There is a risk that the company’s employees or their union will take the 
position that any change of ownership will qualify under Article 163(1) even if 
there is less than a fifty percent change in shareholding. However, even if a 
new shareholder is not a controlling shareholder, any substantial change in 
management and employment policies will trigger Article 163(1) because such 
changes will directly or indirectly affect the employees. 
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144 Id. art. 6. 
145 Id. art. 3(2). 
146 Law 5/1999, art. 47(2)(E) (1999) (Indon.). See, e.g., Memorandum, Temasek 
Holdings, Temasek to Appeal to Indonesia Supreme Court, available at 
http://www.temasek.com.sg/Documents/userfiles/files/kppu_09may.pdf and is also 
available at http://www.kppu.go.id/docs/Putusan/putusan_temasek.pdf (Indon.) 
(discussing how Singaporean investment holding company Temasek’s cross 
ownership of Indosat and Telkomsel was deemed to be anticompetitive behavior). 
147 See generally Law 13/2003 (Indon.). 
148 Law 13/2003 art. 163 (Indon.). 
149 Law 13/2003 art. 163(1) (Indon.). 
150 Id. 
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Moreover, under Article 163(2) of Law 13/2003, the employers of both 
the acquiring and target companies have the right to terminate or maintain 
employment in the event of a change in a company’s status, merger, or 
consolidation, subject to the payment of severance and long service payment 
as provided by Article 163(2).151 In practice, the rights of employees affected 
by M&A transactions are governed by collective labor agreement provisions 
entered into by and between the company and the company’s labor union.152 
Transfers of corporate ownership do not affect the validity of a collective labor 
agreement because such agreements prevail until their date of termination.153 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR 
INDONESIA 
This article will use the Netherlands’ securities regulations as a 
benchmark to analyze whether the Indonesian securities regulations have 
adopted rules according to best practices. Since the Indonesian legal system 
originated from the Dutch colonial era, the two systems share commonalities 
in their corporate and securities legal structures. 
A. Laying Down the Foundation for Comparing Takeover Rules 
To provide a proper comparative study from which solutions for 
improving Indonesia’s takeover rules can be derived, this article will begin by 
analyzing the general legal and economic framework of takeovers. 
 
An acquisition or takeover is characterized by the change of control 
within a company. Therefore, Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt use the term 
“control transaction” to define any transaction in which the acquirer attempts, 
through offers made to the company’s existing or current shareholders, to 
acquire sufficient voting shares to give the offeror control over the company 
by appointing their “nominees to the board of that company.”154 Davies and 
Hopt differentiate a “control transaction” from other forms of change in a 
company’s corporate control in two ways. First, a control transaction lacks a 
corporate decision because the acquirer initiates the transaction, unlike, for 
example, a merger, which is a joint corporate decision.155 Second, a control 
transaction has an external party—the acquirer—that will take control of the 
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151 Id. art. 163(2). 
152 Id. art. 116-35. A collective labor agreement is a contractual relationship that forms 
the Indonesian industrial relations model that consists of, among others, employment 
contract, company policy, collective labor agreement, and the extensive involvement 
of the government in a tri-partite relationship with the company and the employees as 
a group. 
153 Id. art. 131(1).  
154  Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 225, 225 (Reinier 
Kraakman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2008). 
155 Id. 
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company, 156 which may give rise to competing interests among the acquirer, 
the existing shareholders, and the management boards of the target company. 
In practice, there are various ways to conduct a takeover, such as through 
private and direct contract between the acquirer and a small number of 
(controlling) shareholders, through the purchase of shares on the market, and 
by a general, public offer to all shareholders of the target—all of these 
methods face the same problem. 
 
There are corporate structures under which a takeover may take place, 
including no controlling shareholder, a controlling shareholder, and the impact 
of non-shareholders.157 With each of these structures, the underlying legal 
issue remains the same: where is the locus of decision-making regarding a 
takeover deal? In other words, who has the final say, and how does that 
decision impact affected parties who are not involved in the decision-making 
process? This issue reflects the central tension of a takeover, that the basic 
principle of free transferability of shares versus recognition that such transfer 
of control has various consequences for the target company and related 
parties.158 
 
First, if there is no controlling shareholder or ownership is dispersed 
among the shareholders, the shareholders cannot influence the company.159 
The locus of decision-making of such a target company is not among the 
shareholders, but within the boards of management. In a company with this 
structure, a decision to change corporate control will be heavily influenced by 
the target board’s incentives.160 The boards may insist on going forward with 
the takeover deal or may block the transaction by making the target company 
less attractive because the deal might affect their jobs, i.e. they may be 
promised better remuneration or the deal might threaten their job stability.161 
Ultimately, the decision to sell rests with the shareholders who own shares of 
the target company. However, board members who deal with the day-to-day 
operations of the company can strongly influence shareholders’ decisions 
because board members have better information regarding the company.162 
 
Second, company control may be held by a small percentage of 
shareholders or a group of shareholders known as the “block-holder.” The 
acquirer is likely to come to an agreement with the block-holder first and then 
decide whether, and on what terms, to make a general offer to the non-
controlling shareholders.163  In such a case, issues may arise between the 
majority shareholders, as the controlling entities of the company, and the 
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minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder may sell the company to an 
acquirer whom the minority shareholders prefer less, and this decision may 
affect the minority shareholders’ treatment.164  In addition, the controlling 
shareholder may engage in rent-seeking activities, or “tunneling,” by 
transferring assets out of the company, siphoning off profits to escape 
creditors, and propping up troubled firms in a group using loan guarantees by 
other listed group members.165 
 
Since minority shareholders face such challenges, they should be 
protected by the mandatory tender offer rule. When corporate control changes 
from the controlling shareholder to the acquirer, the acquirer must extend an 
offer to the remaining shareholders at a price that includes the premium given 
to the previous controlling shareholder. As a result, the public/minority 
shareholders sell their shares at a premium price higher than that regularly 
traded in the market, although the setting of the premium price may vary 
across jurisdictions. Therefore, the mandatory bid rule distributes of wealth or 
control premium making what was exclusive to the controller enjoyed by all 
shareholders. This makes the price for corporate control more expensive, 
potentially deters efficient bidding and creates an inefficient allocation of 
resources, but gives public shareholders greater protection.166 Koen Geens and 
Carl Clottens write, “[t]he full bid requirement causes the bidder to internalize 
[sic] all the external effects that result from the extraction of private benefits. 
This not only improves the competitive position of a value-enhancing bidder 
but even places all bidders on an equal footing.”167 
 
Finally, the protection of the non-shareholders with an interest in the 
outcome, or the “stakeholders,” is another issue. Two important stakeholder 
classes who are greatly affected by takeover transactions are the employees 
and creditors of the target company. In practice, rules that protect the interests 
of the stakeholders can take various forms, including creditor protection,168 or 
employee protection.169 The extent of the employees’ involvement depends on 
their role in corporate decision-making—whether they are closely engaged 
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with the board, potentially by having a labor union or a representative on the 
board. 
 
This article will now analyze the Dutch legal system, which 
incorporates the EU Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Rules. In addition to 
the shared legal tradition between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the EU 
Takeover Directive that incorporates the mandatory bid rule is relevant 
because Indonesia adopts a similar approach. 
B. General Overview of Dutch Securities Regulations and the EU 
Takeover Directive 
 During the 1990s, Dutch securities law recognized many types of self-
regulation, although many of these have been replaced by statutory 
regulations. At present, Dutch securities regulations, including public 
offerings, can be found in the Act on Financial Supervision (Wet op het 
financieel toezicht; “AFS”), enacted on January 1, 2007, and decrees issued 
under this Act (e.g., Besluit openbare biedingen, Wft, the Decree on Public 
Offers).170 The AFS compiles all the rules and requirements that apply to the 
financial markets and their supervision. The AFS supervises Dutch financial 
institutions, such as banks, insurers, and collective investment schemes. In 
addition, the Competition Act,171 the Works Council Act,172 and the SER-
Merger Code of 2000,173  all apply to takeover deals. The Dutch public 
takeover law applies when a public offer is made or being prepared for 
securities of Dutch limited liability companies that are allowed to trade on the 
regulated Dutch markets, such as the Eurolist Amsterdam.174 
 
The AFS also includes provisions to implement the EU Takeover 
Directive, as incorporated in the AFS since October 28, 2007, and Article 
2:359A of the Dutch Civil Code (BW).175  EU Directive 25/2004/EC on 
Takeover Bids provides the common principles, general requirements, and 
minimum standard of rules that all members of the European Union must 
follow during takeover bids for publicly listed companies traded on a regulated 
market.176  The EU Directive must be adopted by each member state by 
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170 Wet op het financieel toezicht [Act on Financial Supervision], Stb. 2012, p. 682 
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171 Mededingingswet [Competition Act], Stb. 2011, p. 162 (Neth.). 
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176 See Christian de Brauw et al., The Netherlands, in COMMON LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
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implementing rules in accordance with each country’s legal system.177 In its 
Directive Recital, the regulatory objectives of the Directive are specifically 
contemplated, including legal certainty across EU member states or the 
harmonization of takeover rules, protection of the shareholder interests, 
especially minority shareholders, employees and other stakeholders, and the 
freedom and primacy of shareholders to prevent of management board actions 
against a bid.178 The Directive aims to balance the freedom of shareholders 
with the long-term protection of the company.179 
 
Several key principles of the Takeover Directive have been adopted by 
the Dutch legal system. First is the mandatory bid rule, which aims to protect 
minority shareholders by compelling the acquirer to offer an “equitable price” 
to the other shareholders.180 Squeeze out and sell out rules are other major 
principles in the Takeover Directive.181 Post-bid defensive measures, namely 
the “board neutrality rule” and the “break-through rule,” introduced in the 
Takeover Directive are relevant in the Netherlands, especially in litigation on 
takeover bids.182 High profile cases in the Netherlands such as Rodamco, ABN 
AMRO, Stork, and ASMI shape the guiding rule for the permissibility of 
defense measures against takeover bids.183 Finally, the Directive recognizes the 
need to protect other stakeholders, including the target company’s employees’ 
rights by promoting their right to information and their right to issue an 
opinion.184 
 
 The Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten or “AFM”) is the supervisory body of the Dutch financial market, and 
is responsible for approving all takeover bids in the Netherlands. Pursuant to 
Section 5:74 (1) of the AFS, “[n]o party may make a public takeover bid for 
securities admitted to trading on a regulated market that has been licensed in 
accordance with Section 5:26(1), unless by an offer document approved by the 
Authority for the Financial Markets . . . .”185 Furthermore, the Dutch judiciary, 
the Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, has been playing 
an active role in developing the rules for takeovers. The Enterprise Division 
may decide whether to, extend the period of a mandatory bid after considering 
all relevant interests,186  exempt the mandatory bid,187 or order a takeover 
bid.188 This Court can also, at the request of the target company, suspend the 
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http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm (describing 
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178 See Directive 24/2005/EC. 
179 MARCUS PARTNERS, supra note 177, at 29. 
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181 Id. art. 15-16. 
182 van Bekkum et al., supra note 10, at 33. 
183 Id. at 33-4. 
184 Directive 24/2005/EC art. 6 (1) and art. 9 (5). 
185 AFS s. 5:74(1) (Neth.). 
186 AFS s. 5:72(2) (Neth.). 
187 AFS s. 5:72(3) (Neth.). 
188 AFS s. 5:73(1) (Neth.). 
2013]  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE INDONESIAN  115 
!
exercise of voting rights of the new controlling shareholder, prohibit the new 
controlling shareholder from taking part in a general meeting of shareholders, 
order a temporary transfer of management of shares, or suspend or nullify a 
decision reached by a general meeting of the shareholders.189 In addition, the 
Enterprise Division can order the new controlling shareholder to reduce its 
ownership if it violates the rule on market concentration or fair competition 
objectives.190 If there is a dispute about setting a fair or equitable price for a 
mandatory bid, the Court can determine a price that is considered fair.191 
C. Lessons from the European and Dutch Takeover Rules 
A full assessment on the efficacy of the Indonesian takeover law from 
a comparative law perspective is best served by regime-specific comparison, in 
this case being the European and Dutch takeover regime. This article 
highlights several aspects that are worth comparing: the definitions of 
takeovers and public bids, the rules governing a mandatory bid, including 
pricing, disclosure of control structure, the engagement of stakeholders, and 
the role of the supervisory authority and the judiciary. Issues such as hostile 
takeovers and defensive mechanisms are less relevant because the Indonesian 
legal practice has never experienced such transactions. 
 
Definition of “Bid” 
First, this article will compare the terms that are used in the 
Netherlands and Indonesia regarding a takeover bid. In the Netherlands, the 
general offering rules recognize several different types of offers or bids, the 
most popular of which is the full offer.192 In a full offer, the offeror makes an 
announcement, which contains the offer price or stock that is traded, that it 
aims to acquire all securities of the target company—that is, all issued and 
outstanding shares of the relevant class.193 In general, the offeror may offer 
cash for the securities of the target company, but it can also conduct an 
“exchange offer” in which securities are offered in exchange for the securities 
of the target company.194 The offeror is usually required to issue new securities 
to make an exchange offer. A full offer becomes a mandatory bid when there 
is a change of control of the company, which triggers the mandatory offer 
obligation.195 AFS Section 1:1 defines a “public takeover bid” as “a bid for 
securities as referred to in Section 217(1) of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code, 
made by means of a public announcement, or an invitation to make a bid for 
securities, whereby the bidder has the intention to acquire these securities.”196 
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An offeror can make a partial offer, which is an unconditional and 
irrevocable offer for securities to acquire no more than thirty percent of shares 
with voting rights, both issued and outstanding, and, therefore, there is no 
change of control.197 This offer is an easier way for an offeror to buy a 
substantial amount of securities compared to normal trading, although block 
trading is also an option.198 A partial offer may not result in the acquisition of 
more than thirty percent of the issued share capital of the target company, 
which would be a change of control and the offeror would be required to make 
a bid for all of the shares. 199 
 
 Finally, there is the tender offer, which is an invitation to owners of 
securities of the target company by the bidder to offer their securities for a 
price to be determined by the existing shareholders themselves.200 This offer is 
restricted to acquisitions of less than thirty percent of the voting securities of 
the target company. 201  A tender offer allows the offeror to invite the 
shareholders to sell their shares for a price set by each of the tendering 
shareholders. Furthermore, a tender offer stipulates the number or percentage 
of shares to be acquired by the offeror, and is addressed to all holders of the 
class of shares to which the offer relates.202 However, the tender offer is 
uncommon in the Netherlands:203 since its introduction, the only successful 
tender offer was issued by Bergson Holdings N.V. for a part of the ordinary 
shares of Hunter Douglas N.V.204 
 
Meanwhile, the takeover of a public company in Indonesia is 
commonly conducted through an acquisition of that company by the 
controlling shareholder, which leads to a mandatory bid obligation, or a 
“mandatory tender offer” (“MTO”). There are different procedures for 
conducting an MTO and conducting a general public offer, or a Voluntary 
Tender Offer (“VTO”).205 In practice, VTO transactions in Indonesia have not 
resulted in a change of control, 206 which is similar to the Dutch partial offer 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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scheme. Therefore, the shared legal practices between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands are relevant for mandatory bids (MTOs in Indonesia) and partial 
offers (VTOs in Indonesia), but the Dutch-style full offers and tender offers 
have never occurred in Indonesia. 
 
Mandatory Bids 
As mentioned above, takeovers in Indonesia are commonly done by 
acquisition of the public company, which triggers the mandatory bid 
requirement. In such cases, an offer becomes mandatory if it causes a change 
of “control.” Hence, the definition of “control” is significant in Indonesia. 
Similarly, a mandatory offer due to change of control is recognized under 
Dutch law, although a change of control can occur in the Netherlands by 
launching a full offer, a practice that is not recognized in Indonesia. The 
mandatory offer requirements protect minority shareholders by preventing 
them from being expropriated through an unfavorable deal.207 While Indonesia 
introduced this concept in 2000, the Netherlands enacted the mandatory offer 
requirement in 2007, after adopting the Takeover Directive. 
 
The Takeover Directive does not define control, but AFS rules 
governing a mandatory bid provides guidance for the concept of effective 
control. Under Dutch law, a person is deemed to have effective control if that 
person has directly or indirectly assumed 30%, or more, of the voting rights in 
a Dutch limited liability company, which is incorporated in the Netherlands 
and whose shares or certificates are traded on the regulated market.208 Most 
other European countries have their threshold for the trigger of mandatory bid 
around 30 to 30 1/3% percent.209 Compared to the thirty percent threshold in 
the Netherlands, the threshold in Indonesia has gone from twenty percent in 
2000 to twenty-five percent in 2002, and increased to fifty percent after the 
enactment of Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 in 2008.210 This increase is 
attributed to the regulatory objective to increase takeovers in Indonesia.211 
 
The change of control threshold can be achieved via indirect control of 
the company, which may meet the thirty percent requirement in the 
Netherlands. This is possible when a shareholder of a company acquires shares 
in a company that has shares of the company in which the shareholder also has 
a stake. Pursuant to AFS, a shareholder with indirect control is “any party that, 
either on its own or together with persons with which it acts in joint 
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consultation, acquires, either directly or indirectly, predominant control over a 
public limit company . . . shall make a public takeover bid . . . .”212 The 
indirect action approach is recognized in the Indonesian regulation describing 
the definition of takeover as a form of direct or indirect action that causes 
change of control.213 
 
Further, Dutch law limits control based on the quantitative threshold 
of thirty percent, while in Indonesia there is the possibility of changing 
corporate control based on the degree of influence in the company’s 
management. If a person can influence the corporate management and policy, 
it is deemed to be a controller.214 
 
In conclusion, while both Indonesia and the Netherlands recognize the 
mandatory bid requirement, the impact on its regulatory objectives, such as 
protecting minority shareholders, might be different. For example, the 
Indonesian regulations are less protective of minority shareholders because the 
control threshold is 50%, rather than the 30% threshold in the Netherlands. 
However, the Indonesian concept of assessing control based on the degree of 
involvement in the company’s management can protect the minority 
shareholders, which is a concept not recognized in the Netherlands. 
 
Determining the Price for a Mandatory Bid 
The mandatory bid rule is intended to distribute the control premium 
to all shareholders. Therefore, the offer price must be higher than the publicly 
traded price. In the Netherlands, the mandatory offer shall be made pursuant to 
a “fair” or “equitable” price (billijke prijs).215 The price is fair when it is “the 
highest price paid by the offeror or the persons with which it acts in joint 
consultation for securities of the same category or class as that to which the 
mandatory bid relates during the year preceding the announcement of the 
mandatory bid.”216 In other words, the offer price is determined by the highest 
price for which the offeror bought the same class of shares in the year prior to 
the action that triggered the mandatory bid obligation. The AFS states that the 
fair price shall be specified by decree if the offeror bought the shares for a 
price in excess of the fair price, or if the offeror did not acquire such shares 
within the year before the mandatory bid.217 If the offeror has not bought 
shares before, the offer price is the average list price over the last year.218 
 
As mentioned above, Indonesian law introduced the mandatory offer 
rule earlier than the Dutch regulation.219 Since introducing this rule, Indonesia 
has changed the price formula from using the “highest price” to using the 
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“average highest price” of the publicly traded shares on the stock market.220 
The formula change arguably facilitates a more active takeover market because 
it, allows the offeror to offer a lower premium price to the shareholders and 
thus makes takeovers less costly. Furthermore, by setting the price based on 
the average highest price within a certain period, any potential excess price 
due to volatility or a sharp increase of share price due to information leakage 
will be reduced.221 In contrast, Dutch law, in accordance with the EU Takeover 
Directive, does not rely on the price movement in the stock market, but on the 
previous offer of the acquirer.222 
 
Despite these different approaches, both the regulations in Indonesia 
and the Netherlands aim to offer a premium control price to the shareholders. 
The main difference between the two countries is the role of the judiciary in 
the Netherlands (see above discussion) in determining the equitable price, 
should any party object to the mandatory offer price.223 This makes price 
setting more flexible and allows it to be assessed on a case-by-case basis 
because it is more adaptable to a creative legal structure that is designed to 
lower the mandatory offer price. 
 
Disclosure Regarding Control Structure 
The acquirer’s identity and the deal structure are important issues that 
heavily impact investment decisions, especially those made by public 
shareholders. The EU Takeover Directive requires certain information to be 
disclosed in a takeover bid, such as the terms of the bid, the identity of the 
offeror, the financing of the takeover, and share classification.224 Furthermore, 
the target company is subject to extensive disclosure requirements,225 which 
address the control structure of the target company, such as the existing capital 
structure, the deviation from the standard of voting rights equal cash-flow 
(dividend) rights by virtue of share classification or any restriction on rights 
over shares, indirect shareholdings, and the power of the board members. 
According to Vermeulen, the disclosure of control and ownership information 
enables investors to make well-informed choices about their investments and 
discourages deviations from the standard “one-share-one-vote” rule.226 This 
rule complements the already existing EU Transparency Directive,227 which 
already provides a framework for periodical and transactional disclosure in 
general. Although disclosing information does not directly prevent the 
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controlling shareholder from expropriating the rights of the minority 
shareholder, as in the case of mandatory bid, Erik Vermeulen argues that 
disclosure and transparency are “crucial to effectively regulate the financial 
market, while at the same time, discouraging market manipulation and abusive 
tactics.”228 
 
The identity of the new controller may depend on the concept of 
“person” under Indonesian law and “acting in concert” as defined by the EU 
Takeover Directive. These concepts help identify when a party, which can 
consist of a group of parties, possesses indirect control of a company. Pursuant 
to the EU Takeover Directive, if one person has made an agreement with one 
or more shareholders regarding the governance of the company, they can be 
considered a single controlling shareholder.229 This rule has been adopted by 
Dutch law, which adds the definition of “acting in concert.”230 
 
Disclosures of information can be seen from the perspective of the 
acquirer, the target company, and the bid itself. In Indonesia, Bapepam 
Regulation IX.H.1 (2011) aims to introduce better disclosure of information 
about control, and focuses more on the acquirer and the terms of the bid. For 
example, the terms of the mandatory bid are part of the information that the 
offeror is required to make available.231 If the acquirer is a company, it must 
disclose its establishment, line of business, capital structure, board structure, 
and the identity of its shareholders, including the beneficial owner and any of 
its affiliates.232 The rule defining a “person” also incorporates not only one 
entity, but also parties in an association or organized group, which can 
constitute a single controller.233  There is no further explanation for what 
constitutes an “organized group,” so the regulator has discretion when 
deciding whether to approve a bid. 
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After comparing the rules, Indonesian regulation may be improved by 
focusing on the disclosure requirements about the target company’s control 
structure, which are found in Art. 10 of the EU Takeover Directive, but have 
not been incorporated into Indonesian law. The control structure of the target 
company, such as any deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule or the rule 
concerning shareholding structure, is not fully addressed in the Indonesian 
takeover regulations. Bapepam-LK has issued regulations concerning conflict 
of interest transactions,234 which apply if the parties to a takeover potentially 
have conflicting economic interests. Recent amendments to Bapepam Rules on 
the annual reports of Indonesian publicly listed companies also address 
beneficial ownership disclosures. 235  However, complex control structures 
deserve more attention because they provide public shareholders with a more 
complete understanding that may influence their decision-making. 
 
Stakeholder (i.e. Employee) Engagement 
Regulations that address the role of employees in a takeover 
transaction are aimed at protecting employees as an integral part of the target 
company’s stakeholders. Employee protection is incorporated into the EU 
Takeover Directive, as indicated by the right to be properly informed, or 
information rights, 236 and consultation rights in accordance with national 
law.237 Application of these rights is governed under bid requirements,238 
disclosure obligations,239 and information for and consultation of employee 
representatives.240 
 
Under the national law of the Netherlands, the Social Economic 
Council of the Netherlands’s (Sociaal-Economische Raad or “SER”) Merger 
Code applies to the process of acquisition and/or takeover. 241 The SER Merger 
Code is applicable to takeovers that occur via a public bid.242 Before a public 
announcement regarding a takeover is made, the employee association must be 
informed about the content of such a takeover announcement and, if the prior 
announcement conflicts with securities regulations, the notification must be 
made at the time of the public announcement.243 In practice, after the initial 
announcement is made, the offeror and the target company must notify the 
employee association and provide them with a statement concerning the 
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234 See Bapepam Regulation IX.E.1 (2009) (Indon.). 
235 See Bapepam Regulation X.K.6 art 2(e)(10) (2006) (Indon.) (requiring companies 
to disclose the name of subsidiaries and association companies, and their information). 
236 See Directive 24/2005/EC consideration (13) (“[A]ppropriate information should 
also be given to the representatives of the company’s employees or, failing that, to the 
employees directly.”).  
237 Id. consideration (23). 
238 See id. art. 6(1) (requiring the boards of the offeree company and the offeror to 
notify the employees or their representatives of the bid); see also id. at 6(3)(i) 
(detailing what the bid information must contain). 
239 See id. art. 9(5) (requiring the boards to provide opinions concerning the takeover 
to the employees or their representatives). 
240 Id. art. 14. 
241 See SER Merger Code of 2000. 
242 Id. art. 5(1). 
243 Id. art. 3(a). 
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background for and the consequences of the transaction.244 In addition, such 
notification must be sent to the Secretariat of the SER.245 As part of the 
employees’ engagement, the employees’ associations are entitled to be part of 
the consultations about the deal, 246 and are entitled to express the employees’ 
opinions.247 Finally, the SER establishes an Adjudication Committee in the 
event of any employment dispute resulting from a merger or takeover plan.248 
 
The level of engagement of employees reveals a distinction between 
Indonesian and Dutch law in takeover-transactions: Indonesian law does not 
have any requirement to consult the employees during a takeover. Indonesian 
general corporate law only provides that a takeover must consider the 
employees’ interests, but do not provide detailed rules regarding this principle. 
249 Meanwhile, Indonesian labor laws only deal with the employees’ rights to 
receive compensation for employment termination.250 There is no forum for 
employees to express their opinions regarding the deal itself. This lack of 
employee involvement shows that Indonesian company law is less 
stakeholder-oriented, compared with the Netherlands. 
 
The Role of the Supervisory Authority and the Judiciary 
There are two institutions in the Netherlands that are influential in 
ensuring the integrity of takeover: the supervisory body and the judiciary. The 
AFM is the supervisory body for public offers of securities. The AFM 
regulates and supervises compliance with the takeover rules, and has authority 
to oversee public offerings when the Dutch takeover code is applicable. All 
takeovers require AFS approval, which means that the offeror is only allowed 
to make a public offer if the AFM has approved the offering document.251 This 
provision gives the AFM the power to suspend a public offer until it is sure 
that all requirements have been met, especially the payment terms.252 The 
AFM is different from most other European authorities because it is not 
empowered to approve or disapprove all disclosures during the takeover 
process.253 As a result, takeover rumors might be leaked to the market without 
an official announcement that such transaction been approved by the AFM.254 
Although the AFM does not have this power, it can still use its general powers 
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244 Id. art. 4(2); see also, CALKOEN ET AL., supra note 192, at 4 (summarizing 
requirements to notify trade unions, if any, during any acquisition or divestment 
process by issuing a statement regarding the rationale for the transaction, intentions 
regarding company policy, and social, legal, and economic consequences of the 
transaction). 
245 SER Merger Code art. 8(1). 
246 Id. art. 4(4). 
247 Id. art. 4(3). 
248 See id. art. 9 (creating the Adjudication Committee to deal with all disputes 
concerning the implementation of the Merger Code). 
249 Law 40/2007 art. 126(1)(a) (Indon.). 
250 Law 13/2003 art. 163(1) (Indon.). 
251 AFS s. 5:74(1); see also M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers & P.A. van der Schee, supra note 
176, at 199-200.  
252 Raaijmakers & van der Schee, supra note 176, at 199. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 199-200. 
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as provided in Article 5:61 of the AFS.255 Furthermore, the AFM has authority 
to relieve an offeror of some of its obligations.256 
 
Aside from the AFM, the Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court 
of Appeals, or the “Ondernemingskamer,” is part of the judiciary. The 
Enterprise Division settles disputes regarding the requirement to carry out 
mandatory offers, such as whether such an obligation exists after an 
acquisition,257 the mandatory bid period,258 or determination of a “fair price” in 
a mandatory offer.259 An order from the Court can lead to heavy intervention 
in the governance of company, such as suspending the voting rights of the 
party with predominant control, prohibiting the new controller from attending 
a general meeting of the shareholders, nullifying a decision made at the 
general meeting of shareholders, 260 or ordering the controlling shareholder to 
reduce its percentage of stock. 261  There have been cases in which the 
Enterprise Division heard disputes about the legality of anti-takeover 
defenses.262 In short, the Dutch court specializing in commercial matters has 
extensive authority to settle disputes related to takeovers and public bids in 
order to safeguard the market. 
 
 It is important to compare the role of the supervisory authority and the 
judiciary between the two countries. On one hand, the role of the judiciary in 
safeguarding the capital market in Indonesia has been limited, and there have 
been no adjudicated cases about takeover or public bid disputes. Therefore, 
case law concerning this field does not exist in Indonesia. On the other hand, 
Bapepam’s role as the regulator of the capital market has increased throughout 
the years. Bapepam has discretion to carry out actions, such as extending the 
period for a mandatory bid, 263  and nullifying a general meeting of 
shareholders. 264  This discretion may become problematic because some 
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255 Id. at 200; see also AFS s. 5:61 (allowing the AFM to force a company to correct a 
notification if the company was initial incorrect). 
256 Raaijmakers & van der Schee, supra note 175, at 200; see also AFS s. 5:81 art. 3 
(“On application, the Authority for the Financial Markets may grant a full or partial 
dispensation from the provisions laid down by or pursuant to Sections 5:74(1), 5:76(1) 
and (2), 5:78 or 5:79, if the applicant demonstrates that it cannot reasonably comply 
with those provisions and that the objectives which these sections seek to achieve are 
achieved in other ways.”). 
257 AFS s. 5:72 (2)-(3), 5:73 (1)-(2). 
258 Id. art. 5:72(3). 
259 Id. art. 5:80b(1). 
260 Id. art. 5:73(2). 
261 Id. at art. 5:73(3). 
262 See Note, Danielle Quinn, Dutch Treat: Netherlands Judiciary Only Goes Halfway 
Towards Adopting Delaware Trilogy in Takeover Context, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1211 (2008) (detailing the merger of ABN AMRO and the Royal Bank of Scotland 
in which the Enterprise Division played a crucial role). 
263 See, e,g., Maybank Gets Extension Until June 2011 to Sell Down BII Stake, THE 
EDGE (Dec. 4, 2010, 6:04 PM), http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/business-
news/178082-maybank-gets-extension-until-june-2011-to-sell-down-bii-stake.html. 
264 See, e.g., Arinto Tri Wibowo, Saham Rights Issue CPRO Belum Tercatat Di BEI, 
VIVA NEWS (Mar. 16, 2009, 7:49 PM),  
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actions, such as nullifying a general meeting of shareholders, arguably should 
be subjected to the judicial authority rather than the regulator, because a 
general meeting of shareholders itself is an act of corporate governance, not an 
administrative or licensing requirement.265 Indonesia can learn from Dutch law 
and engage a special tribunal or chamber to resolve capital market and other 
disputes about the financial system. The existence of the Enterprise Division 
demonstrates that the enforcement of securities regulations requires not only 
administrative proceedings, but also judicial proceedings to ensure due process 
and legal certainty. 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
This article has discussed the rules governing takeovers in Indonesia. 
Indonesia has enacted rules that protect the public and minority shareholders, 
such as instituting a mandatory bid if a company reaches a certain threshold 
that indicates a change of control. Disclosure requirements have been the 
backbone of the Indonesian securities regulations and have been supervised by 
Bapepam-LK, which soon will transform into the independent FSA. In 
addition, there exist country-specific characteristics, such as the relationship 
between securities regulations and FDI requirements and the sell-down rule 
that preserves market liquidity. 
Mandatory bids in Indonesia have been increasing to a higher threshold 
in order to facilitate a more active takeover market. The share percentage 
threshold above which a mandatory offer is triggered is lower in Indonesia 
than in the Netherlands. However, in Indonesia control can be assessed by the 
degree of one’s influence within the company’s governance as well as by share 
percentages. In pricing a mandatory bid, each country adopts its own 
approach, although the Netherlands adopts a more case-specific approach due 
to its judiciary’s involvement. The Dutch disclosure rules are more advanced 
because they are aimed at capturing indirect structures, such as a pyramid 
structure or cross ownership. Indonesia can learn from the Netherlands 
counterpart about how to increase employee involvement during a takeover 
deal. Although in the Netherlands, as in Indonesia, the employees do not have 
authority to approve or disapprove a takeover, they are empowered by the right 
to receive information, the consultation right, and a dispute settlement forum 
specifically for labor matters in the event of a change of corporate control. 
Indonesian law, on the other hand, prescribes that a takeover must consider the 
employees’ interests without setting out further detailed rules. Finally, the role 
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http://analisis.news.viva.co.id/news/read/41035-
saham_rights_issue_cpro_belum_tercatat_di_bei (Indon.); Bapepam Nullifies Sale of 
Lapindo to Freehold, Tempo Interactive (Nov. 11, 2006, 4:36 PM), 
http://www.tempointeractive.com/hg/ekbis/2006/11/22/brk,20061122-88206,uk.html. 
265 Pursuant to the Indonesian company law, and company law in general, a general 
meeting of shareholders is a governance body within a corporation in which 
shareholders can exercise their voting rights. It is not a regulatory or licensing 
requirement, which needs regulatory approval. Therefore, one may question the 
legality of annulment of such action by the regulator. 
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of the judiciary in Indonesia must be improved in order to provide a fair, 
orderly, and efficient capital market. 
